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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the World Trade Organization (\VTO) meeting in Seattle in
December of 1999, a fe\v dozen self-proclaimed anarchists smashed shop
\vindo\vs and looted do\vnto\vn locations of major international chains such
1
as Starbucks and The Gap. While most observers properly condemned
such antics, the attention paid to these riots obscured the significance of the
2
peaceful protests that dre\v more than thirty thousand to Seattle. This
eclectic group of demonstrators, comprised of environmentalists, bluecollar union \VOrkers and their leaders, and the religious "Roman Catholic
nuns and priests, liberal Protestants, progressive evangelicals, Je\VS and
Buddhists"- expressed concern at the gro\ving po\ver of the \VTO and
3
other unelected international organizations.
Globalization, the effects of\vhich inspired the demonstrations in Seattle, shapes the post-Cold War \Vorld. Journalist Thomas Friedman defined
globalization as the \Vorld\vide "inexorable integration of markets, nationstates and technologies" driven by free-market capitalism and having a
4
\videspread homogenizing effect on cultures. Along \Vith other kinds of integration comes a demand for the integration of la\VS.s Yet, as Friedman
observes, \vhile globalization enables nations to innovate and thrive, it also
produces a po\verful backlash from those \vho are left behind by the ne\v in6
ternational system.
Many Americans are troubled by the authority of entities such as the
WTO, \Vhich has promulgated rules on a broad range of important issues
• Thanks to Professor Steven Calabresi, Aaron Kirk, David Fink, and Hillary Krontz.
1
Timothy Egan, Talks and Turmoil: Tlte Yiole11ce,· Black /.Iasks Lead lo Pointed Fingers in Seallle.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at AI.
2

/d.

3

Diane Butler Bass, Religious Join Global 'Greens'; Anolher IYTO Lesson, SEAIILE POST-INIELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2000, atA13.
4
THO~tAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 9 {2d ed. 2000). This book provides an
excellent, if overly optimistic, introduction to glob3lization.
s See infra subpart II. C.
6
FRIED~fAN, supra note 4, at 9.
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since it was created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
7
(GATT) in 1994. These concerns are not based on irrational fears of
worldwide tyranny under the United Nations enforced by black helicopters.
Rather, they result from a sense of powerlessness amid the perception that
important decisions are being made farther and farther away from local and
democratically accountable governments. Wharton School globalization ex.pert Stephen J. Kobrin put it this way: "When all politics is local, your vote
matters. .But when the power shifts to these transnational spheres, there are
8
no elections and there is no one to vote for.';
At least ostensibly, the agreements binding the United States to sweep..
ing international rules and regulations are treaties. The Constitution vests
with the president and the Senate the power to make treaties, and it requires
9
two-thirds of the Senate to approve any treaty. Only recently, however,
have treaties begun to regulate matters previously thought to be entirely
10
domestic.
At the same time, recent developments have virtually eliminated the states' role in treaty-making, as the president only rarely consults
the Senate when treaties are negotiated, and Congress ignores the two-thirds
requirement when it approves agreements such as the GArr·through ordi11
nary legislation. A clear trend has emerged: the concentration of decision-making power in the_hands of the national government, and even
international bodies, at the expense of state governments.
Nevertheless, as the centrip.etal force of globalization pulls nations'
laws toward a worldwide standard, another trend in the United States pulls
in the opposite direction the Supreme Court's recent revival of federalism
12
limitations on the power of the national govemment. Several months be7

The \VTO was created after the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tnr•
iffs and Trade (GATI). See Final Act Embodying Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Tmde
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1 (1994);
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). The WTO is, in part, a dispute settlement body that adjudicates trade disputes among nations and passes judgment on national laws relating to tmde. See id. One of the objec·
tions to the latest GAIT agreement is_that it imposes standards on various state regulatory powerssuch as banking, insurance, and local tax-breaks and incentives that have been useful for policy ex·
perimentation. See infra subpart II.C. For detailed descriptions of the WTO dispute resolution system
and its potential jurisdictional reach, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATr/\VTO OJSPUTB
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1996); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization ofInternational
Trade Relations, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775 (1996-97); Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Obloff.
uconstitutionalization and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Compc·
tence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1999).
8
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 191.
9
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.. 2.
10
See infra subpart ILC.
11
See infra subpart II.B (explaining the declining role of states in treaty making)~ infra notes JS-52
and accompanying text (describing how states were originally thought to have a role in treaty making).
12
Federalism addresses the amount of power respectively allocated to the states and the national
government. The Court's federalism jurisprudence is discussed in Part III. The Court's revival of fed·
eralism has generated a tremendous amount of scholarship. For an excellent, concise source of argu·
ments for and against federalism, see DAVID SHAPJRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 122•23 (1994).
II
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fore the Seattle riots, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alden v. Alaine articulated a broad frrutte\vork for this "ne\V federalism," \Vhich had begun in the
13
early 1990s. In Alden, a five-member majority-Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor- held that Congress
may not, pursuant to any of its po\vers under Article I of the Constitution,
14
subject a state against its \viii to a la\vsuit by a citizen. In \Vords that
\Vould have cheered the Seattle demonstrators, Justice Kennedy \vrote that
the people, in establishing the constitution as a federal system, rejected the
idea that the '\viii of the people in all instances is expressed by the central
15
po\ver, the one most remote from their contro1."
In 1999, the same majority also severely constrained the ability of
Congress to subject states to such suits pursuant to its po,ver under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment even \vhen an ann of the state partici16
pates in the marketplace as a business. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary•
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that the
State of Florida could not be sued for patent infringement \Vhen a Florida
state ,ency used a means of college financing patented by a private company.1 In a companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Some recent advocates of a strong judicial role in enforcing federalism believe thnt federal courts should
eschew bright-line rules in favor of stringent revie\v of the legislative process to nuke sure thJt Congress
gave sufficiently serious attention to federalism concerns. See Stephen GardbJwn. Rclhinking Constitutional Federalism, 14 TE.x:. L. REv. 795 (1996); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and LimiiS of
Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HAR.v. L. REv. 2181 (1998). Jackson b:Jie\·es thJt courts should miC\v
"the adequacy of congressional process to justify assertions or federnl power." Jackson. supra. ell 2258.
Gardbaum believes that courts should police "Congress's delibemtivc processes and its reasons for regulating" to make sure that the federal government action has been adequately justified. Gardblum, supra, at
799. As Part II explai~ however, the Treaty Power presents a unique problem that ~Us for more rigid en.
forcement of federalism limitations by the Court. In addition, the Court's most retcnt federalism decisions
set down exactly the kind of bright-line rules rejected by Jackson and Gardbaum. See Infra Pan Jll.
13
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that l\1aine state probation officers could not sue the state in ~1aint
courts for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Sb.ndards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216{b). 203(xJ);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring invalid a statute caJ1UlUJldeering stltc c:<ccuti\·e of.
ficials); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (placing limits on Congress's pow·er to~~ civil
rights legislation under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Trib~ of Fla.\'. Florida. 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the pO\Vet to oven ide states' Elt\·cnth
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); New York v. United States. SOS U.S. 44 (1996) {holding
that Congress may notforce aH
state legislature to choose bet\vecn adopting federal regulations or tt~ng tide
of toxic waste); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking do\\11 a ponion of the Gun Free
Schools Act as exceeding Congress•s po\ver under the Commerce Clause).
14
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712; see also discussion infra Part IL
IS /d. at 759.
16
See Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E.~pense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (striking
down federal unfair competition legislation as applied to states because it \\':IS not mnediaJ, as required by §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E."tpensc Bd. v. CoJI. Sav. Bank. 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Florida cannot be sued for alleged pltent infringement resulting from the~~
tions of a state agency in using a patented methodology for calculating mnounts to be pJid under annuity
contracts to finance college expenses).
17
Fla.. Prepaid, 521 U.S. 627.
H
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Postsecondary Education Expense Board, the Court held that Florida did
not waive its sovereign immunity when an ann of the state allegedly en18
gaged in ·unfair competition by misrepresenting its own program.
In 2000, the Court continued to enforce federalism limitations with a
vengeance. In Kimel v. .Florida Board of Regents, the Court struck down a
provision of the. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 that enabled
state employees to sue states, holding that Congress lacked the po\ver to ab19
rogate state sovereign immunity, even under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In United States v. Morrison, the Court sent the message that Congress's exercise of the cotnmerce power must correspond at least loosely with interstate
commerce by striking down the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which created a cause of action in federal courts for crimes of violence moti0
vated by gender? The Morrison decision is especially significant becaus.e it
21
reaffinns the case that started it all United States v. Lopez. Lopez represented the first time in nearly sixty years that the Court struck down a stat22
ute as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
So far, the treaty power remains untouched by the Court's new federal23
ism. Since the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Missouri v. Ho/land,
most scholars have assumed that the treaty power is not limited by concerns
24
of federalism. According to the prevailing view, the president and the
18

19
20
21

.

.

Col/. Sav. Bank, 521 U.S. 666.
120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
.

514

.

.

u.s. 549 (1995).

22

The last time the Court had struck down a federal statute as exceeding the commerce power was
in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 316 ( 1936) (holding that a statute regulating coal industry labor
practices governed mining and ·production, not commerce).
23
252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding a treaty with Great Britain regulating the hunting of-migratory birds,
even .though Congress may have lacked the power to regulate the matter under its Article I powers).
24
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LA\V OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt.
e (1987) (hereinafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Although the Restatement position rcfl.ects the majority
view, it is not without its critics. Recently, Professor Curtis Bradley argued that although Missouri was
easily subject to a much narrower interpretation, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and )ower
courts actually broadened it. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mtcu.
L. REV. 390, 425-26 (1998). According to Bradley, the expansion of the subject matter of treaties (per·
mitted by courts interpreting Missouri) is part of an historically contingent twentieth-century "intema·
tionalist conception'' of foreign affairs that contradicts the design .o f the Constitution by rejecting
federalism concerns. Id. at 391. A return to a ''dualist" conception of foreign affairs would at least rc·
quire that Missouri's holding be narrowly interpreted. Jd. at 458-59. I agree with this vie\V, and this Com·
ment is in part an e~ort to bolster the position of Bradley and others through the examination of the most
recent Supreme Court decisions and the perspective of a conversational model of democracy.
For some recent .scholarship supporting the prevailing view of the treaty power as unlimited by federalism concerns, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 442.
n.2 (2d ed. 1996); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Co11cernitzg "Self
Executing'~ and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 61 CHI."'!KENT L. REV. 51 S, 530 ( 1991 ); Thomas Healy,
Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalis.m and the Treaty Power. 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1726, 1731 (1998). Healy observes that even the Supreme Court's federalism decisions prior to 19.99
suggest the Court would overturn Missouri. Nonetheless, he argues that such a decision would under·
'
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Senate, acting pursuant to the Treaty Clause, can regulate traditional state
activities to an extent that Congress alone, acting under enumerated po\vers
25
such as the Commerce Clause, cannot.
As long as Congress's Article I po\vers \Vere deemed virtually unlimited from the Ne\v Deal until recently no need arose to test the holding
of Missouri v. Holland. Ho\vever, the Court's most recent decisions make
26
it clear that the comprehensive revival of federalism \Viii continue.
Mean\vhile, scholars have proposed \Vays in \vhich the treaty po\ver's
unique inununity from federalism under Missouri could be used to pass legislation that \vould othenvise be unconstitutional as encroaching on state
prerogatives. For example, Professor Gerald Neuman has proposed that the
27
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) could pass constitutional
muster as an implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Po28
litical Rights (ICCPR). Similarly, scholars have suggested that treaties
might be used to outla\v the death penalty and that "federalism concerns
29
\Vould prove no bar to the preemption of state la\v" under such a treaty.
As the Seattle riots suggest, these issues \viii occupy the attention of
people other than academics. Rapid globalization makes it all but certain that
the uniqueness of the treaty po\ver \vill clash \vith the gro,ving legitimacy of
the "ne\v federalism." This Comment argues that the ne\V federalism should
prevail. Negotiations in far-flung locations, rather than at to\vn meetings, \Viii
more likely deten11ine the rights and responsibilities of American citizens in
mine the ability of the federal government to conduct foreign policy cfrectively nnd would in general b:
harmful to American interests. /d. at 1749..50. To illustrate, Healy notes that the Vienna Con.,·cntion.
which grants an alien arrestee the right to contact her home country•s consulate, may connict \\ith stltc
Jaws. The refusal of local la\v enforcement officers in the United Stntcs to carry out this provision.
Healy argues, v.·ould endanger American citizens abroad. /d. at 1750.51; Vienna Convention on Consubr
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, § I(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
For discussion of a recent case involving the failure to grant rights to a foreign national under this pro\ision
of the Vienna Convention, see infra notes 230-33 and accomJUnying te.~L Cf. David l\f. Gorov~ TreatyMaking and the Nation: 1he Historical Foundations oftlze Nationalist Conception ofthe Treaty Power. 98
MICH. L. REv.. 1075 (2000) (concluding from an historical study thlt fC\v subject nutter limitations apply to
the treaty power, but state sovereignty limitations probably do apply).
25
See. e.g.• HENKIN, supra note 24, at 442 n.2.
26
See. e.g.• Alden v~ 1\iaine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 2QOObb-2000bb-4 (1994). The statute prohibited federal or state regulations that
substantially burdened the exercise of religion \vithout a compelling government interes~t and then only
if the least restrictive means were used.
28
See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dintension of RFRA. 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 49-53
(1997); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Dec. 19, 1966, S. ExEC. DOC. E, 95-2,
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The relevant provisions of the treaty state thilt the right "to manifest (one's]
religion or belief in worship" is a right that may only be limited \Vhen "necess3ry lo protect public
safety, order, health, or morals" or "the fundamental rights nnd freedoms or others." /d. at 311. 18(3).
The Supreme Court had struck down RFRA as exceeding Congress's power to enact c:ivil rights legislation under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
29
Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teet/1 to the Unilcd States Ratification ofthe Co,,.e.
nant on Civil and Political Rights: Tlze International Hunzan Rights Conformity Act of/993, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1209, 1213 n.24 (1993).
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the twenty-first century. The Court, however, through its power to enforce
constitutional limitations on national power-while reinforcing the role of the
states, may provide one answer to the excesses of globalization.
This Comment briefly recounts the development of the treaty power
and explores the justifications for exempting it from states' rights limitations, concluding that the holding of Missouri is inconsistent with the new
federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and that a treaty power exception_cannot be justified in an era of globalization. Part II recounts the
development of the treaty power and the ways treaty making has changed
since the framing. Subpart II.C describes the expanding subject matter of
treaties and analyzes examples of proposed and ratified treaties that may
conflict with states' rights. Part III examines the Supreme Court's new federalism in light of Alden and other recent decisions, delineating the potential impact of significant federalism cases on the treaty power. This Part
concludes that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence suggests its willingness to ovenule Missouri v. Holland or narrowly interpret its holding.,
Part IV considers the arguments for maintaining the treaty power exception
to federalism limitations. Finally, Part V argues for the value of judicial enforcement of federalism. This Part concludes that, under a conversational
model of democracy, federalism provides the best opportunity for restoring
citizen confidence by bestowing respect on state government.
II.

THE EVOLVING TREATY POWER

The Constitution provides that the president "shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two30

thirds of the Senators present concur.'' The inclusion of the Treaty Clause
within Article II gives it special significance: it provides a unique and in31
dependent grant of power to the federal govemment. Overtime, ho\vever,
its uniqueness has increased. From the time of the nation's founding to the
1940s, the treaty power developed from a rarely utilized mechanism for
concluding agreements with foreign nations to a potential tool for circumventing the limits placed on federal domestic powers.
This Part describes how the making of international agreements has
changed since the Constitution was written. As it concludes, the foreign affairs power of the national government continues to encroach on traditional
state prerogatives and to oveiWhelm the protections provided for the states
by the text ofthe Constitution. Subpart A discusses the scope of the treaty
power, noting that the Court held it to be immune from the Constitution's
implied limits on federal power. Subpart B discuss_es other kinds of international agreements that have begun to replace the formal treaty despite re30

31
·

U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2~ cl. 2.
See Bruce Ackemtan & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 10'8 HARV. L. REV. 799, 808

( 1995) ("The Founders established a very complex Jaw-making machine: one system for constitutional
amendment, another for treaty-making, a third for statute-making.").
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taining the status of treaties. For instance, congressional-executive agreements, passed by simple majorities-of both houses and signed by the president, are one means of circumventing the formal requirement of t\•1o-thirds
majority Senate approval. These agreements reduce the political protection
afforded the states through their representatives in the Senate. Subpart C
discusses ho\v the range of subjects governed by treaties exceeds the Frmners' vision for the treaty po\ver. This subpart explains that treaties are no
longer limited to matters of extraterritorial concern and discusses some of
the \Vays that treaties no\V seek to govern matters traditionally thought to be
the exclusive domain of the states. Ultimately, this Part concludes that the
\veakening of the states',.jnfluence in the treaty process and the blurring of
the distinction bet\veen domestic and foreign affairs effectively removes all
justifications for a treaty po\ver exception from federalism concerns.
A. The Treaty Polver's /11Znzunity fronz Federalisnz LinJitations
All po\vers vested in the national government by the Constitution are at
32
least theoretically Iimited. The principle that national government po\ver
cannot intrude upon the zone of activity exclusively reserved to the states is
33
implied in the structure of the Constitution. Nothing in the text of the
treaty clause in Article II suggests that the national government's po\ver to
make treaties ·is any broader than its Article I po\vers. Yet by 1920, the Supreme Court had declared that the treaty po\ver \Vas uniquely unconstrained
34
by states' rights. This s_ubpart argues that the treaty po\ver exception \Vas
a vague, un\varranted departure from the Framers' intent.

The materials relating to the drafting of the Constitution contain almost
35
no discussion of the scope of the treaty po\ver. Instead, the Federal Convention debates centered on the process by \Vhicb a treaty \Vould be enacted \Vhether the House of Representatives should be involved and \Vhat
36
proportion of the Senate should be required for approval. Ho\vever, the
Framers did clearly express t\vo concerns: First, the states should be
strongly .represented in the process of negotiating and approving treaties;
and second, the government should exercise the treaty po\ver only rarely.
The processes for negotiating and approving treaties discussed during
the Federal Convention reflected a substantive concern for protecting states'

32

Federalism addresses the amount ofpo\ver respectively allocated 10 the states and the natiorml
government The Court,s federalism jurisprudence is discussed in Part Ill.
33
This concept is referred to as ~'state sovereignty federalism:• See infra subpm.III.A.
34
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
35
Bradley, supra note 24, at 410; see also Shakelford 1\iiller, Tlzc Treaty }.faking Power. 41 A\t. L
REv. 527. 529 (1907) ("At no time .... did the convention discuss the scope or c.~tcnt of the pO\\·er; it
merely considered the question as to \Vhere the po\ver should be lodged who should' exercise iL The
same is true as to the 'Federalist'.•••").
36
Bradley, supra note 24, at 410.
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rights. The Framers selected the Senate, rather than the House, to approve
treaties because each state would have equal representation in the Senate
8
and the state legislatures would directly elect senators} The Founders intended that the Senate would not only approve treaties, but also help negoti39
ate them. Indeed, they envisioned that the Senate would act as "a councillike body in direct and continuous consultation with the Executive on mat40
ters of foreign policy." Although critics_of the Articles of Confederation
had complained that treaties approved under them were impossible to enforce,41 the Framers wished to preserve the treacy-making process, which
42
required the assent of nine out of thirteen states. -They accomplished this
preservation by requirin§ in the Constitution that two-thirds of the senators
3
present approve a treaty.
The Framers deliberately made the treaty process difficult because they
believed that treaties should be made rarely and only for limited purposes.
Perhaps they recognized the potential for abuse. It was the "prevailinJ.i
mood at the Convention" that it should not be too easy to make treaties.
James Madison noted during the debate that treaties had been too easy to
45
make under the Articles of Confederation. Madison also concluded from
"a clear and candid view" of the state ratification debates that its partici~
46
pants assumed the treaty power was limited in scope. During the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, for example, opponents of the Constitution argued
37

Id. at 412.

See~ e.g., Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 507 (Max Fanand ed.,-rev. ed. 1937) [here-inafter Madison Convention Notes];
Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Oft
1787, supra, at 392-93 [hereinafter Notes of James Madison]; Bradley, supra -note-24. at 412. An early
draft of the Constitution vested the power to make treaties with the Senate alone. See Notes of James
Madison, supra~ at 392-93. United States senators have been directly elected by the people of their re•
spective states since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendm.ent in 1913. See U.S.. CONST. amend.
XVII.
39
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 360-61 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 }; Bradley, supra note
24, at 412. The Framers also chose the Senate to conduct and approve-treaties because its members• sixyear tenus would allow greater long-tenn perspective and also because its smaller size was better suited
to fast and secret negotiations with foreign nations. See Ackennan & Oolove, supra note 31, at 81 0.
40
Arthur Bestor. HAdvice "from the Very Beginning, "Consent" Wizen the End Is Achieved, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 718, 726 ( 1989); see also HENKIN, supra note 24, at 177.
41
See Jack L. Goldsmith; Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs. and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1644 ( 1997) ("[S]tate noncompliance with national treaty obligations [under the Articles of Confcdera·
tion] undennined the national government's ability to bargain effectively with foreign nations.••).
42
See Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union arts. JX, X; see also LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 49 (1'990).
43
See HENKIN, supra note 42, at 49.
44
HENKIN, supra note 24, at 442 n.2.
45
See Madison Convention Notes, supra note 38, at 548; see also Quincy \Vright, The Collslilll•
tiona/ity of Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT,L L. 242,242 (1919) ("The framers of the American Constitution did
not anticipate or desire the co.-aclusion of many treaties!').
46
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 ( 1796).
38
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that the treaty po\ver \Vould encroach on states' rigbts. In response, the
Federalists assured them that the treaty po\ver had limits. Edmund
Randolph said that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the par8
ticular right of any state, can 'b e affected by a treaty"'t4 Similarly, George
Nichols reasoned that the national government did not have the p_
o,ver to
enact a treaty "\vhich shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or
9
inconsistent \Vith the delegated po,vers.,;4 After the Constitution \Vas approved, Thomas Jefferson, during his tettn as Vice President (and President
of the Senate) \vrote, in a_draft of the Senate's JJ.1anual ofPar/ianzentalj'
50
Practice, that the treaty po\ver should be narro\V in scope. As Jefferson
noted, although the Founders did not agree on the specific subjects to \Vhich
the treaty po\ver ought to extend, by implication they intended the pO\Ver to
1
be limited by other parts of the Constitution.5 Among the limitations \Vas
that the treaty po\ver could not extend to "the rights reserved to the states;
for surel~ ~e Pr~ident and S~nat~ cannot do hJ treaty what the whole govenunent IS Interdicted from dotng tn any \vay." ·
During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court's decis·ions concerning the treaty po\ver did very little to define the limits of such po\ver; they
simply confirmed that treaties trumped state la\vs and constitutions, even in
3
matters typically regulated by the states.5 This rule is evident from the text
54
of the Supremacy Clause. But the Court did not say \Vhether the national
gavenunent may use the treaty po\ver to supersede the rights of states as
sovereign entities \Vithin the federal system. The Court did not directly address the scope of the treaty po,ver, nor did it definitively say \vhether the
Tenth Amendment or the sovereignty of the states limits that po\ver.ss

47

See BradleylJsupra note 24, at413.
48
- The Debates in the Con~·ention oftlze CommonweJJillt of J!irginia, rcpnntcd in 3 Ewor•s DEnATES,
469, 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter Y'uginza Dcb3tcs].
49
!d. at 507.
.
so See Thomas Jefferson, A Manual ofParliantentary Practice: For the Usc ofthc Senate ofthe United
States, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY \VRJTlNGS 4201 421 (\'lither S. Howell cd., 1988).
51
/d. at420.
52 ..
/d. at42l.
53
Seelf e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham; 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (holdi_ng that a treaty granting aliens rights
to inheritance takes precedence overan inconsistent state la\v'Jimiting inheril3ncc by aliens).
54
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution. and the La\vs of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or \vhich sh3ll be made. under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme La\v of the Land; and the Judges in every Sta-te shall be bound
thereby, any Thing_in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not\'tithstanding.").
55
Bradley, supra note 24, at 418-19. Bradley also notes that none of the lre3lies ehallc.nged on
states' rights grounds actually sought to regulate the relationship bct\v.cen states and their own citiz~
but only ''the treatment of aliens, in return-for similar ~tment of U.S. citizens residing obro:td." /d.. at
420. But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Tlze Plenary Power Badground ofCurtiss~\'lright. 70 U.. COLOc L.
REv. 1127,1130 (1999) (arguing that the Court-paid lip service to states~ rights while, in proc1ic~ feder·
alism placed "few meaningful limits on the treaty po,ver~').

743

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The Court did suggest, however, that such limitations existed, even as
it continued to uphold exercises of the treaty power. For example, the
Court_noted that the treaty power could not be used to change the character
6
of a state's government or cede its territory to another state.5 The Court
also observed that uses of the treaty power must be consistent "with the nature of our government and the relation. betwe_en the States and the United
7
States" and the distribution of powers between them.5
With the Lochner Era came an opportunity for the Court to address the
8
scope of the treaty power.5 In 1913, Congress passed a statute regulating
9
the hunting of migratory birds.5 States sued to prote·ct what they viewed as
their own property, and two federal district courts held that the statute ex60
ceeded the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. - Since
a majority of the current Supreme Court also took a narrow view of the
61
Commerce Clause, the Justice Department felt certain an appeal \Vould be
62
fruitless. Instead of appealing the lower court decisions, the Wilson administration hit on the idea of reintroducing. the statute in the fonn of a
63
treaty with Canada. The administration successfully negotiated the treaty,
64
which the Senate ratified and Congress implemented.
In Missouri v. Holland, .described as ''perhaps the most famous and
65
most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs,'' the Su56

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (''It would not be contended that [the treaty power]
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govem·
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its
consent.").
57
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S~ (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) {noting that the treaty power may extend to nil
objects "not inconsistent with the nature of our government and the relation between the States nnd the
United States"); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (observing that the treaty power
covered all subjects "which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of
powers_between the general and state governments").
58
In this Comment, I use "Lochner Era" to refer to the tenures of ChiefJustices Fu11er, \Vhitc, nnd
Taft from approximately 1910 to 1930-during which period the Supreme Court narrowly construed
the· commerce power and struck down numerous federal statutes as exceeding Congress's Article l powers. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LA\V 18 (2d ed.
1998). However, the Lochner Era acquired its name from an earlier case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) (striking down a New York law limiting the working hours ofbakers), which typified the court•s
weU-known intolerance for all state laws regulating industry during this period. See FARBER, supra, -nt 18.
59
37 Stat. 847, 848 (1913).
60
See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United _States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154
(E.D. Ark. 1914).
61 .
.
.
.
.
See, e.g., Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
62
See HENKIN, supr(l note 24, at 190.
'

'

'

63
64

'

/d.

The treaty was negotiated with Great Britain, then responsible for Canada's foreign relations. Sec
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, ·u.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702; Bmdley,
supra note 24, at 423 n.l88. Congress implemented it in cb. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified ns
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703 {1994)).
6
s HENKIN, supra note 24, at 190.
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preme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty. Justice Holmes, in an
opinion noted for its eloquence, rejected Missouri's argument that the treaty
po\ver \Vas limited by federalism to the same degree as the conunerce
po,ver: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for
the national \Vell being that an act of Con~ess could not deal \Vith but that a
treaty follo\ved by such an act could ... .'trU It \Vas enough for Holmes that
6
the Treaty did not "contravene any prohibitory \Vords, in the Constitution. s
The implied rights of states did not stand in the \vay; no "invisible radiation
69
of the Tenth Amendment'' limited the scope of the treaty po\ver.
Holmes's opinion proceeds from the premise that the Treaty Clause_
provides a separate delegation of po\ver to the president and the Senate in70
dependent of the Constitution's delegations to Congress. As such, the
treaty po\ver has indep_endent scope. Ho\vever, Holmes did not sketch out
the limits of this scope. He only \vrote vaguely that, '\ve do not mean to
71
imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making po\ver."
In any event, Holmes's opinion has been almost universally interpreted
72
as protecting the treaty po,ver from federalism-based attacks.
That
Holmes considered the treaty po\ver a unique creature can.be gleaned from
the diction of the opinion as \Veil. Particularly striking is Holmes's employment ofDanvinian metaphors: he likened the Constitution to an organism "the development of \vhich could not have been foreseen completely
73
by the most gifted of its begetters." In deciding \vhich po\vers \'lere reserved by the Tenth Amendment, Holmes \vrote, '\ve must consider \Vhat
74
this country has become." This evolutive vision of federal po\vcr con75
trasts sharply \Vith most Lochner Era jurisprudence. Even a stubborn and
back.\vard-looking Supreme Court \Vas \Villing to ackno\vledge that more
66

See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,416 (1920). This case technically dealt \vith the imple·
menting legislation, not the 'treaty itself. but "if the treaty is valid there C3n be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary nnd proper m~- to c.~ecutc the powCJS or the
Government" /d. at 432.
67
/d. at433.
68
69

!d.

/d. at 433 ..34.

70

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, MtERICAN CONSTlTUTJONAL LA\'/ § 4-S, at 227 (2d ed. 1988). The
idea that the treaty power is independent of other delegations ofpO\Ver to the national government is fur•
ther discussed and criticized in subpart IV.A infra~
71
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433.
72
See HENKIN, supra note 24,_-at l90...91; TRIBE, supra note 70, nt 227; Healy, supra note 24., ot 1731.
73
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433'.
74
/d. at 434.
75
See FARBER, supra note 58, at 18 ("[The Lochner Ero] \WS a mther dreary [period] in the Coun's
history, dominated as it was by Justices nostalgic for the JetTersonian America of small fann~rs tu1d
craftsmen:' But Holmes, in contrast to most of his colleagues, defended the rights or ustates and the
federal government to experiment with novel fonns of market regulation.}. \'/hat is csp:cially
noteworthy about Missouri is that Holmes was Qble to persunde his eoUe:1gucs to support a broJ.der rotc
for the national government where the treaty power \vas concerned.

745

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

flexibility is required when interpreting foreign affairs provisions of the
76
Constitution than when interpreting domestic ones. While some scholars-have concluded that the treaty power had always been broader than Con77
gress's Article I powers, Holmes's description in Missouri of a changing
Constitution seems inconsistent with this view. As the nation evolves,
Holmes's opinion declared, so evolves the treaty power.
Since Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court has provided some clues
as to the limits of the treaty power. From Reid v. Colvert, a 1957 decision
concerning the trial of the wives of two U.S. servicemen on military bases,
most scholars have concluded that the specific provisions of the Constitution
78
that place explicit limitations on federal power also limit the treaty power.
Other "remnants'' of state sovereignty in the face of the treaty power include states' rights not to have their territory ceded to a foreign country and
79
the guarantee of a republican form of govemment. Even so, .the Supreme
80
Court has never held a treaty provision to be unconstitutional.
The Missouri decision caused such concern that its critics made a serious
81
attempt during the 1950s to override it with a constitutional amendment.
Proponents of the "Bricker Amendment" feared that U.S. ratification of several proposed international human rights treaties could be used to enact civil
rights legislation that would circumvent the ordinary legislative process and
82
supplant state laws. The Bricker Amendment would have subjected treaties
83
to the same limitations as any other piece of legislation.
The Bricker Amendment failed, and the controversy surrounding it and
84
Missouri v. Holland faded, in part because the. supporters of the amendment managed to persuade the Eisenhower administration not to become a
85
party to the human rights treaties. More significantly, by this time the Supreme Court was recognizing increasingly expansive domestic federal

76

Here I imitate Laurence Tribe's observation about the separation of powers. See TRIBE. supra
note 70, at 211 ("The Constitution's separation of powers and its arrangement of checks and balances
are less precise [in matters of foreign affairs] than a survey of the text mightsuggest.,).
77
See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 55, at 1129-30 (arguing that the Supreme Court had imposed
fewer federalism limits on the treaty power from the beginning); Golove, supra note 24* at 1079-80 (nr·
guing that Missouri did not descend "like a bolt oflightning out or a clear blue s,ky"}.
78
· See Reid v. Colvert, 354 U.S. l (1957) (holding that a defendant's right to trial by jury under the
Sixth Amendment cannot be abrogated by the-terms of a treaty); see also HENKIN, supra-note 24, at 185.
79
See .HENKIN, supra note 24, at l93.
80 ld.
81
Senator Bricker ofOhio and Frank Ho1man of the American Bar Association mobilized the effort.
See Bradley; supra note 24, at 426-27.
82
See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost ofSenator Bricker,
·g9 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 ( 1995).
83
The amendment provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through legis]ation which would be.valid in the absence of a treaty." S. REP. No. 83-412, at 1(1953).
84
Bradley, supra note 24, at 427.
85
See id. at 428.
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86

power. As Congress's Article I po\vers increased, a broad treatypo\verno
87
longer seemed exceptional. The Ne\v Deal jurisprudence rendered Missouri largely academic until the 1990s, \vhen the Court revived federalism
limitations on the commerce po\ver \Vith Lopez.
Developments in \Vorld affairs after the Ne\v Deal also diminished the
importance of Missouri. During World \Var II, the Roosevelt administration \Vas compelled to use international agreements that hnd the effect of
treaties, but did not require the arduous treaty-approval process. Subpart B
considers these international agreements.

B. Alternatives to tlze Treaty Pon'er
In the years after Missouri v. Ho-lla1zd legitimized a uniquely broad

scope for the treaty po\ver, another significant change further \veakened the
states' influence in treaty making. Increasingly, the federal gover1unent bypassed the textually mandated constitutional process for ratifying treaties.negotiation by the president \vith approval by t\vo-thirds of the Senate rand
instead adopted congressional-executive agreements, \Vhich require only a
85
simple majority vote in each house and the signature of the president.
This subpart discusses the increasing use of these agreements. It concludes
that \videspread circumvention of the treaty clause further diminishes state
involvement in the treaty approval process and undertnines the argument
that the process provides political protection for the states.
The rise of the ~ongressional-executive agreement res~lted _indirectl~
9
from the Senate's fatlure to approve the Treaty of Versatlles tn 1919.
From the time of the Founding until the 1930s, most scholars and officials
thought the Senate possessed exclusive po\ver to approve lasting interna90
tional agreements. President Monroe felt it necessary to seek t\vo-thirds
Senate approval \vhen he completed an agreement 'vith Britain to demilita91
rize the Great Lakes after the War of 1812. Even though later presidents
conducted stop-gap executive agreements and military arrangements \Vith
other nations, foreign governments understood that they \Vould have to insist on a treaty if they \Vished to bind the United States_govemm_
ent beyond
92
the length of any particular administration.
·
86

See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta 1\iotel, Inc. v. United Stntes, 379 U.S. 241,257-58 (1964): \'lickm"d v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942);. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113·17 (1941); see also
Acket1nan & Golove, supra note 11, at 857 (making a similar point).
87
TRIBE, _
supra note 70, at 227 {"The Supreme Court ••• _has so broadened the scope of Congress'
constitutionally enumerated powers as to provide ample basis for most imaginable legislative e~ct•
ments quite apart from the treaty power.'").
88
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note24, § 303 cmt. e.
89
Ackennan & Oolove, supra note 31, at 802.
90
'
08•
See
i d. at 8_
91
See id. at 816-17.
92
See id.. at 816,823-24.
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However, when the Senate failed to approve the Treaty of Versailles
despite the support of a majority of Senators, criticism of the difficult con93
stitutional treaty approval process grew~ By the time World War II broke
out, the Senate's rejection of the League of"Nations ''becam.e a symbol of
94
isolationist irresponsibility." Momentum began to build for a constitu95
tional amendment to strip the Senate of its treaty-making prerogative. In
1945, the House approved such an amendment, but President Roosevelt declined to pursue it in the Senate because he did not want to risk losing Re96
publican support on other issues. Nonetheless, scholars Bruce Ackerman
and David Golove argue that World War II marked the same kind ofturnin
Rather than change the Constitution, Roosevelt simply chose to ignore it.,
In the midst of total war, states' rights seemed_quaint, and it seemed paramount that the president should be able to make agreements quickly, without mounting the kind of intensive political effort often required to muster a
98
two-thirds majority in the Senate.
Although treaties are by no means obsolete, and the Senate still occasionally refuses to ratify them, to the great consternation of the president
and vice-president, the vast majority of international agreements since
99
World War II have not been approved by the Article II method. Many of
the most recent, far-reaching international accords, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement ~AFTA) and GATI, were approved by
100
congressional-executive·agreement.
Significantly, observers believe that
if the president had offered NAFTA as a treaty instead of as ordinary legislation, its opponents probably could have mustered the thirty-four Senate
101
votes needed to defeat it.
However, Congress has acquiesced to this alternative procedure, and
arguments that congressional-executive agreements are unconstitutional
102
have made little headway.
The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled
'

93

See id. at 861.
94 /d.
95 By May of 1944, pons showed that 60% of the American public was in favor of such an amend·
ment. See id. at 863.
96
91 CONG. R.Ec. 4,367 ( 1945); Ackennan & Go love, supra note 31, at 866.
97
Ackennan & Go love, supra note 31, at 866·70.
98
See id. at 870.
99
See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (2d ed. 1995). In 1999, the
Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton had signed in 1996.
The treaty failed to muster even a simple majority. See Senator Jon Kyl, Maintaining "Peace Through
Strength": A Rejection ofthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325. 325 (2000).
100
See Ackerman & Golove,supra note 31, at 801.
101
See id. No fewer than twenty·one state delegations cast a majority vote against the agreement.
and five other delegations were divided. See 139 CONO. REC. 29,722 (1993).
102
Since Franklin Roosevelt,s adminis.tration, the Senate has made scattered attempts to reassert its
constitutional privilege and has on occasion insisted that international agreements ought to take the fonn
of Article II treaties. These efforts have been a]most unifonnly rebuffed or ignored. See Ackennan &
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on their scope or limits. Most scholars insist, bo\vever, that they have the
same scope and force as treaties approved in the textually mandated fashion.104
If this is true, then federalism concerns limit neither congressionalexecutive agreements nor treaties. This conclusion should trouble proponents
of federalism because the practice of congressional-executive agreements circumvents the special protection afforded the states through the t\vo-thirds majority Senate approval requirement Moreover, all justifications for the
uniqueness of the treaty po\ver that rely on the Constitution's text \Vould
simply be irrelevant It \vould not matter that the treaty pO\Ver is found in Article IT of the Constitution rather than in Article I. Instead, the justification
for ignoring federalism concerns \vould have to rest on claims that the legislation in question is of "international concern. " Yet, the distinction bet\veen
domestic and international affairs has become virtually impossible to define
because many current treaties and agreements govern matters traditionally
thought to be domestic. This development is discussed in subpart C.
C. The Decline ofthe Subject-A1atter Linzitation

Missouri v. Holland under1nined state sovereignty limitations on the
treaty po,ver. The other significant textual limitation on the treaty po,ver-the subject-matter limitation has been eroded as \Veil. The enumerated
po\vers of the national government are limited by the very fact of their
105
enumeration.
For example, Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause
106
to regulate matters that do not affect interstate commerce.
Similarly, the
national govenunent seemingly cannot use the treaty po\ver to regulate matters of domestic concern. James Madison assured the Virginia Ratifying
Convention that the object of evecy treaty is "the regulation of intercourse
107
\vith foreign nations, and is extemal.."
It appears, ho\vever, that modem developments have proven Madison
\vrong. In recent years, the subject matter of treaties and other international
Golove, supra note 31, at 900-04. One of the most prominent academic critics of congressional·
executive agreements is Professor Laurence Tribe. \Vbo e.xpressed doubts to the president nnd the Senate
about the constitutionality of the legislation implementing the GAIT agreement that established the \'frO.
See, e.g., GAIT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before lhe Senate Conun. on Commerce, Science. and
Transportation, I03d Cong. 285 ( 1994) (prepared statement of Laurence Trib~ Professor, Harvard Law
School). For an interesting debate about the constitutionality of congressional-e.x~utivc agreements, com·
pare Ackennan & Golove, supra note 31, with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Texl and Strucnue Seriously:
Rejlectionson Free-Fon11Method in Constitutionallnterpretalion, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1221 (1995).
103
See Bradley, supra note 24, at 398.
104
See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 217, 229; Ackenn:m & GoJovc, supra note 31, nt 80S; Bmdlcy,
supra note 24, at 398.
105
This inherent limitation on national powers is sometimes referred tons distributi..-c fed~ralis1n."
See infra subpart III.C.
106
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (1995).
107
Virginia Debates, supra note 48, at 513.
66
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agreements has expanded to encompass nearly every part of what used to be
considered the exclusive domain of state law. This subpart argues that a
"foreign-affairs-only" subject~matter limitation is implicit in the Constitu-.
tion's grant of the treaty power to the federal government because the Framers conceived of treaties as laws governing only foreign relations. Even so,
the national government has increasingly ignored this limitation. This subpart explores ways that the treaty power will conflict directly with federalism concerns in the future, concluding that the argument for treaty power
exceptions resting on a distinction between domestic and international affairs is no longer tenable.
Some scholars have concluded that the Framers intended the treaty
108
power to be flexible enough to ,govern virtually any subject matter. ' As
Hamilton and others argued during the ratification debates, they could not
predict in 1789 every future contingency that could one day require a
109
treaty.
However, the Framers scarcely coQld have imagined treaties such
as the GATT, which function as international legislation binding on much
of the world, or today's human rights treaties, which seek to regulate a
110
broad range of matters traditionally governed by state law~
The Framers
believed there existed a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs}11 Alexander Hamilton not known to sympathize \Vith states'
rights believed that treaties were "not rules prescribed by the sovereign to
112
the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign."
There is
113
evidence that this assumption was valid until recently.
As late as the
1950s, opponents of the Bricker Amendment argued that the subject-matter
114
limitation on treaties made the amendment unnecessary.
Today, however, most scholars support the view that the treaty po\ver
115
In any event, the ·united States has alhas no subject-matter limitation.
See, e.g., Golove, supra note· 24~ at 1132.
109
,See Golove,s-upra note 24, at 1145; Virginia Debates, supra note 48, at 3'63, 505.
110
See infra notes 12442 and accompanying text.
111
Bradley, supra note 24, at 411. Zachariah Cbafee notes that "the vital distinction between for·
eign affairs and domestic matters was taken for granted throughout [the drafting of the Constitution].''
Zachariah Cbafee, Jr., Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv•.345~ 368 ( 1952)~
112
THE F£DERALIST No. 75, at 450-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ).
113
When Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes suggested in a speech to the American Society of In·
ternational Law that the treaty power might be Jimited to matters of international concern and not mat·
ters "which nonnally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the states:• his remarks were
"accepted as authority." See HENKIN, $Upra note '24, at 471 n:87. But see Golove, supra note 24, at
1290 n.728 (arguing that Hughes's remarks were misconstrued).
114
See Bradley, supra note 24, at 430.
115
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 302 cmt. c.; Ackerman & Oolove, supra note 31,
at 843-44; Damrosch, supra note 24, at 530. The Second Restatement, in contrast, provided thnt the
treaty power was limited to matters of "international concern" and not matters of a "purely internal nn·
ture.n See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
ll7{l)(a), § 117 cmt. b (1965). Curtis Bradley critici~ed what he saw as an effort to bootstrap the lack
of a,subject-matter limitation into widespread acceptance. Its most prominent supporters, such as Louis
108
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ready approved or may yet approve treaties and agreements that regulate subjects one thinks of as exclusively local or even personal, from education to
family life.
Rapidly increasing globalization driven by advances in technology has
many salutary effects. Those 'vbo feel they are unable to get satisfaction
from governn1ent at the national level can seek assistance from the international cormnunity. When considering recent genocides in R\vanda and
Bosnia, for example, fe\v persons \vould doubt that human rights is a matter
of international concern and, therefore, appropriate subject matter for a
treaty. As the Restatement asserts, "ho\V a state treats individual human beings, including its O\vn citizens, in respect of-human rights, is not the state's
116
own business alone."

Ho,vever, the extension of treaty making to traditionally domestic areas of la\v 'viii be difficult to stop no\v that it has begun. Public choice
theorists have found that the same forces driving a strong national government are also driving trends to\vard the internationalization of la\vtnaking.
Po\verful interest groups unable to have their \Vay in Congress \viii seek to
achieve results during treaty negotiations or through treaty-enforcement
117
mechanisms.
No\vhere is this more apparent than in the area of com118
merce. Trade \vorks b-est \vith lo\v barriers. Therefore, el:onomic inter119
ests \viii seek regulation (or deregulation) at the international level.
American companies frustrated by federal environmental and labor regulations 'vould much rather see rules governing their business promulgated by
120
an entity such as the WT0.
T\vo scholars, Hannes L. Schloemann and
Stefan Ohlof4 have already noted that this trend has accelernted during the
short time the WTO has been in existence. In a 1999 article, they observed:
The emergence of the \VTO and the experience of the past four years, in
particular the ovenvhelming acceptance and use of the dispute settlement
mechanism, have pushed the multilateral trade system to develop into a protosupranational structure . . . [that] has been charged \Vith more and more tasks
and responsibilities beyond its original scope, both by political dec-isions (ne\v

Henkin, argued for the-change during the \vriting of the Third Restntcment 3Jld then cited to th.e Third
Restatement as though it \vere black letter la\v. See Bradley, supra note 24, at 432-33.
116
·
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24,.at pt. VII,.introduclory note, at 144.
117
See Bany Friedman, Federalism$ Future i11tlte Global Yillage, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1441, 1445
(1994).

See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and tile Regulatory State: A GATT~·Eye
ViewoftheDormant Commerce Clause, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1401-07 (1994).
119
See id. at 1446.
120
During the Seattle protests, labor and cnvironmentllleade~S demanded that President Clinton nega.
tiate basic standards for the \VTO, such as the prohibition of child labor. and a pro~ess th3t ,.,. outd cnJb!e
nations to retaliate against other nations that viol3ted these stnndards. \'lhen the pn:sident propn=-ed that the
Seattle negotiators take up these topics, the talks collapsed. See Egun. supra note I, at A1.
118
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separate agreements) and by external pressure (the popularity of the dispute
121
settlement mechanism).

As corporations gain access to external sources of rules such as the WTO,
they will grow increasingly impatient with states' laws.
It should come as no surprise, then, that conflicts between international
standards and state laws will be felt the soonest in the area of commerce.
Every state has some form of "blue sky laws" that seek to protect consum122
ers against securities fraud.
But the.state securities laws are all over the
map, ranging from regulations that call for a "hands-off' approach to strict
123
requirements that authorize officials to judge transactions on their merits.
The insurance industry, even more than the securities industry, has traditionally been regulated almost exclusively by the states. Yet the most recent GATT agreement, the Uruguay Round that authorized the .WTO,
124
contains standards governing banking, securities, and insurance.
The
Twenty-First Amendment grants states the power to regulate the sale of al25
coholic beverages.l Nonetheless, even before the WTO was formed, a
GATT panel ruled that various liquor taxes and regulations of some fortyone U.S. states violated the prov.isions of the GATT, and that the Twenty126
First Amendment was no barrier.
The U.S. government then took steps
127
to have the laws changed.
The "Technical Barriers to Trade" portion of
the Uruguay GATT imposes "mandatory measures that re ulate products,
that, in the absence of overt tariffs, nations will try to impose de facto tariffs
129
via strict regulation.
One-commentator .properly observed that "[a]t issue
in the [treaty] ratification process ... is nothing less than federal arrogation
of traditional state competence in the law governing private, and in particu130
lar, commercial, relations."

121

Schloemann & Ohloff, supra note 7, at425 n.l. This article discusses potential subs.tantive limi·
tations on the \VTO enforcement mechanism, particularly the-tendency for nations to use nationn1 security as an ironclad excuse for imposing trade barriers. See id. at 425-26.
122
Friedman, supra note 117, -at 1449.
123
See Brian J. Fahrney, Comment; State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption
Due to Increasing Internationalization ofSecurities Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 753, 759-60 ( 1992).
124
See Friedman, supra note 117, at 1451-53.
.
125
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
126
See Friedman, supra, note 117, at 1462; GATI Panel Report, United States-Measures Ajfcclillg
Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (1992), reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS No. S, at 25 (Sept. 1992).
•n See Fnedman,
.
.
supra note 117, at 1462.
128
/d. at 1455.

·a

t29 uee
(" l •

Michael P. Van Alst~ne; Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 690 (1998).
The U.S. laws implementing GATI and NAFTA both respect federalism concerns to a certain extent.
They both contain provisions for a federal-state consultation process and allow only the national gov·
emment to challenge a state's law in violation of the trade agreement. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (1994)
(NAFTA); 19 u.s~c~ § 3512 (1994) (GATT). After all, the \VTO can only punish nations, not states.
110
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Fe\v may pause to consider the potential impact even of human rights
treaties on local la\vs in the United States. There are a number of treaties
that grant rights that individuals can assert against their O\vn governments,
in areas such as racial and gender equality, criminal procedure and punishment, and religious freedom. In many cases, international human rights
131
standards are higher than those provided by the la,vs of American states.
Therein lies the potential for still more conflict
T\vo scholars have suggested, for instance, that human rights treaties to
\Vhich the United States is a party require states such as California to restore
132
affirmative action in :fiovernment and education.
The Convention on the
1
Rights of the Child, \Vhich the United States has signed but not ratified,
contains a number of provisions that grant rights to education, privacy, and
134
Similarly a\vaiting ratification is the
even a certain standard of living.
Convention on the Elimination of All Fornts of Discrimination Against
135
Women, \vhich governs family relations, education, marriage, and even
136
"sports and recreational activities." Some provisions of these treaties \Viii
inevitably clash \vith family la\v in the states; at the very least, legislation
implementing these treaties would greatly ex8and the scope of federal
7
po\ver into the entire range of local concerns.
\Vhile most Americans
agree 'vith these treaties' goals, they may not agree that matters such as
family life and education should be regulated by international agreement.
As Justice Rehnquist reminded us \Vhen the Court declared a. federal
criminal statute unconstitutional in Lopez, "[u]nder our federal system, the
'States ossess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal

persede state la\vs.. The implementing legislation for the Genocide ConvenHowever~ the thrust of this subpart (and this Comment)

is that the national go,·emment may usc the treaties and international agreements to circumvent federalism concerns.
131
See Peter J. Spiro, The Stales and International Hunzan Rig/us Accords, 66 FORDUA~~~ L. REv.
567, 567 (1997) ("The human rights movement is no\v turning its nuention to conditions in the Unite'J
States, and it is increasingly finding instances in \Vhich such practices ran short or international standards."); Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification ofthe International Bt11 ofRights: A Filling Celebration ofthe Bicentennial ofthe U.S. Bill ofRights, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 203,204 (1992).
132
See Conne de Ia Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: Nmv Treaty Lan• Cot~ld Help Jmmcnse(l·,
65 U. CJN. L. REv. 423 (1997); Jordan J. Paust. Race-Basal Affimzali,·e Action and lntemational Lal'!l,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 659, 674 (1997); see also Bradley, supra note 24, nt 403 n. 69.
133
Nov. 20, 1989, 281.L.l\i.. 1448.
134
Bradley, supra note 24, at 403 n.61.
135
Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against \'/omen, op~ncdfor signature Mar. I, 1980, S. EXEC. Doc. No.. 103-38, 1249 U.N. T. S. 13 (entered into force SepL 3, 1981}.
136
Bradley, supra note 24, at 403.
137
See id. at 402-03. Family law is still considered a matter almost exclusively for slnte regulation.
See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,581 (1979) {"'The whole subject of the domestic rem·
tions of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the Ja\VS or the States nnd not the Jaws or th~
United States.'" (quoting In re Bums, 136 U.S. 586,593-94 (1890)).
138
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S . 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrohamson, 507 U.S..
619, 635 (1993)).
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tion, which was used to prosecute war criminals in Bosnia and is probably
supported by most Americans, makes it a federal crime to kill or cause serious bodily hartn in the United States "with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in substantial part; a national, ethnic, racial,- or religious group as
139
such.''
The Second Circuit has detertnined that the provision applies to
140
private conduct committed in this country-. Treaties such as the Genocide
Convention will op-en up vast new areas of criminal law for regulation by
the national government irrespective of federalism limitations.
In the area of crime and punishment, the United States is perhaps most
out-of-step with major industrialized countries in its use of the death penalty.141 The Supreme Court has upheld state~sanctioned executions provided they comport with the Eighth Amendment, and the national
government probably could not prohibit the death penalty under -its Article I
powers. Nonetheless, scholars have proposed that the government could
avoid federalism concerns by interpreting the International Covenant on
142
Civil and Criminal Rights to require the abolition of the death penalty.
As conflicts emerge between state prerogatives and international
standards in treaties and other agreements,- the temptation of the federal
government to resolve disputes in favor of the international consensus will
be strong. Free trade drives the stock market, and free trade depends upon
uniformity. As Professor Barry Friedman concluded, "[g]lobalizing pressures . . . are likely to lead to increased calls to eliminate or further mod143
ify independent state regulatory authority."
The treaty power has grown far beyond what the Framers envisioned.
If the majority of scholars are correct and Missouri v. Holland remains good
law, then the states possess virtually no protections against an exercise of
the treaty power by the federal government. Therefore, the treaty po\ver has
perhaps become what the opponents of the Constitution and strong fede-ral
power feared most an all-purpose vehicle for imposing the will of the national government upon the states. Under such conditions, judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism constraints against exercises of the
treaty power \Vill be crucial to the preservation of the federal system.
.

.

139

.

18 U.S.C. § 109l(a) (1994).
140
See Kadic v. l<aradzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the statute applies to private
conduct "if the crime is committed within the United States or by a U.S. national").
141
Nations and international organizations frequently criticize the United States for its continued
use of the death penalty. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson~ U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for "Racist •· Use of
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,_at Al7 (describing some of this criticism); David Stout. The
Nation: Do as We Say, Not as We Do,· U.S. Executions Draw ScornfronJ Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
l998, § 4, at 4 (same).
142
See Posner & Spiro, supra note 29, at J213 n.24.
143
Friedman, supra note 117, at 1448.
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III. THE REVNAL OF FEDERALISl\i
In 1789, \vhen the Constitution \vas \vritten, the \Vord "State" principally
144

meant an independent nation or country.
The Articles of Confederation
had created an alliance of independent entities, the closest modem analogy to
14
\Vhich might be the United Nations. s Of course, upon ratifying the
Constitution and joining the Union, the states agreed to cede a portion of their
146
sovereignty to the national government It has been the role of the courts to
determine \vhat amount of sovereignty the states forfeited.
T\vo terms are useful \vhen discussing the judicial role in enforcing
federalism. The structure of the Constitution provides protection to the
states from the reach of federal po,ver in t\vo \vays that are in certain cases
147
"mirrors of each other."
On the one hand, the fact that the Constitution
grants Congress enu11zerated po\vers acts as a substantive limit on each
148
po\ver.
If the po\vers of the federal government \Vere limitless, there
would have been no need in the Constitution to spell out each po\ver. This
149
concept is called "distributive federalism."
On the other hand, the Constitution, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments in particular, reserve a
special illlinunity to the states, by virtue of their status as sovereign entities,
150
from the othenvise legitimate exercise of federal po\ver.
This special
1 1
protection is called "sovereignty federalism." s
The Lochner Era \Vas marked by the Supreme Court's strict enforcement
of distributive federalism. In a series of cases, the Court struck do\vn a number of Ne\v Deal statutes that exceeded Congress's po\ver to legislate under

144

Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: 17tc Proper Textual Basis ofthe
Supreme Court's Tenth and Ele1-·enth Amendntenl Decisions, 93 N\V. U. L. REv. 819,830 (1999).
145
SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 58; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Tlze Consent ofthe Go•.-erncd: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article J', 94 COLUr-f. L. REv. 457,469 n.37 (1994) (noting that the D:c·
Iaration of Independence referred to the "free and independent states•• and that the T~ty of P~cc with
Great Britain recognized the legal independence of individual states). The Articles of Confedetation
guaranteed that ~'[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, freedom, nnd independence, and every power, ju·
risdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation e."Cprcssly de1eg3t~ to the United States in Congress assembled." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION nrt. II. However, there is no analogous phrase
referring to state sovereignty in the Constitution. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at SS-59.
146
See Richard A. Epstein. The Federalist Papers: From PraCJical Politics to High Principle, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13,20 (1993).
147
New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down as unconstilutionalan nttempt
by Congress to force the state of Ne\v York to adopt by statute a hmrdous waste 3grecment or take
ownership of its own waste).
148
See id. at 156.
149
MartinS. Flaherty, Are JYe to Be One Nation? Federal Power \:f• ..States' Rights•• In Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277, 1282 (1999).
150
See U.S. CONST. amend. X {"The powers not delegated to the Unit~ States by the Constitution.
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. j; Ne.-,• lcrk,
505 U.S. at 155.
151
See Flaherty, supra note 149, at 1283.
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152

the Commerce :and Necessary and .Proper Clauses.
But the Lochner Era
came to an abrupt end after Roosevelt's court-packing scheme triggered a
"switch in time" that fundamentally changed the Supreme Court's direction,
pavin9 the way for a .reign of virtually unli~ited fe~eral power yis-il-vis the
53
states. For nearly stxty years, the Court dtd not strike down a stngle federal
154
statute for exceeding Congress's power under the Conunerce Clause.
During this time, the Court once briefly attempted to rehabilitate the
155
Tenth Amendment in National League ofCities v. Usery. The Court held
that the federal government could ·not regulate the wages and hours of state
156
National League of Citemployees under the. Fair Labor Standards Act.
ies was overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Anton.io Metropolitan
151
Transit Authority, but then-Justice Rehnquist, in a brief dissent, wrote
that he felt confident the minority view of stronger state sovereignty would
158
eventually prevail again.
Only seven years later, it began to look as though Rehnquist might be
vindicated. In New York v. United States, the Court again considered the
scope of state soverei~cy this time in the context of a dispute about the
159
The Court held that Congress could not force the
storage of toxic waste.
state of New York into a choice between either adopting federal guidelines
or taking title~ of the waste and thereby becoming liable for any damages re160
sulting from improper storage.
New York v. United States began a revival of federalism, the strength
and importance of which did not become fully clear until 1999. The Court,
usually by a 5-4 margin, recognized a number of state protections from fed161
eral overreaching.
Whether the Court held the protection to be grounded
152

The Court struck down numerous federal statutes regulating industry. See, e.g., A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corpi> v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down portions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act that pennitted the President to approve a code regulating the poultry industry).
153
See LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS 217 (1994) ("The power of the nation is virtually
plenary under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.").
154
It bears repeating that, until United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the last time the Court
had struck down a federal statute for exceeding the commerce power was in 1936. See Cnrter v. Curter
Coal, 298 U.S. 238 ( 1935) (holding that a ·statute regulating
coal industry labor practices governed min·
.
ing and production, not commerce).
lSS ·
.
· ·
426 u.s. 833 (1976).
156. /d.
'

157
•
158

'

469 u.s..528 (1985).
See id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159
505 u.s. 144 ( 1992).
160
Id. at 176.
161
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flqres, 521 U~S. 501 (19-91) (placing limits on Congress•s power to
enact civil rights legislation under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. Uni.ted States, .521 U.S.
898 (1997) {declaring invalid a statute commandeering state executive officials); Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not give Congress the
power to override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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in limitations on the cotrunerce po\ver, Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments, it is nO\'l/ clear that the
cases to ether are more than the sum of their parts. In the 1999 Alden v.
63

states' rights grounded in the structure of the Constitution itself.
The
language of Alden, bolstered by the other recent decisions, provides the
frame\vork the Court could build upon to overrule Afissouri v. Holland and
impose federalism limits on exercises of the treaty po,ver and congressional-executive agreements.
This Part examines the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence and explores some of the ramifications of the treaty po\ver. Subpart A looks at
\Vhat has emerged as the most po\verful tool for judicial enforcement of
federalism state sovereign inununity. It concludes that state sovereign
immunity is the most promising vehicle for the Supreme Court's efforts to
impose federalism limits on exercises of the treaty po,ver and congressional-executive agreements. Subpart B examines another aspect of state
sovereignty protection the Court has addressed during the current revival of
federalism the rule against conunandeering of state legislatures and
executive officials. Finally, subpart C discusses the Court's effort to revive
distributive federalism limits and concludes that this principle is unlikely to
be useful in reining in potential abuses of the treaty po,ver.

A. State Sovereign Inznzunity
The federalism protection possessing the greatest potential for conflicts
with the treaty po,ver is states' sovereign immunity from la\vsuits. Through
a series of decisions, occasionally overruling prior decisions, the Court has
developed sovereign immunity into a narro\v, but nearly impenetrable, fortress of state po\ver against federal incursions. This subpart explores the recent cases strengthening sovereign immunity and argues that it is the most
effective means the judiciary can use to limit imprudent exercises of the
treaty po\ver that encroach on state prerogatives.
The Eleventh Amendment explicitly provides the states immunity from
suits "cormnenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi164
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Stnte."'
Ho\vever, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the amendment
means more than its text suggests. First, the Court interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment to prohibit la\vsuits by a citizen against his O\vn state in federal
165
court \vithout the express authorization of Congress.
In 1993, the Su527 u.s. 706 (1999).
163
See id. at 2268 ("Congress must accord States the esteem due to them as joint pJrticipants in a
federal system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the cc:ntrol Go\'emment and the
separate States.").
JM
.
U.S . CONST. amend. XI.
165
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
162
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preme Court overruled a prior decision and removed the possibility that
Congress could abrogate a state's immunity from lawsuits in federal courts,
166
even by a specific exercise of the commerce power. Finally, in 1999, the
Court filled in the last gap in the wall of state sovereign immunity. Congress could not, the Court held, force a state to be sued in its own courts for
167
violation of federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause or for
168
infringement of patents and trademarks.
The Court also limited the circumstances under which Congress could subject states to such lawsuits un169
der Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But much more important for the revival of federalism \Vere the
Court's reasoning and language. In Alden v. Maine, the most thorough of
the 1999 opinions, the Court confirn1ed that state sovereign immunity was
rooted not in the Eleventh Amendment, but in the system of dual sover170
eignty provided by the structure of the Constitution itself.
Significantly,
the case dealt with the same federal statute ·· the Fair Labor Standards Act
171
(FLSA)
that twenty-three years earlier, the Court had proclaimed could
not apply to state government workers in the short-lived National League of
172
Cities v. Usery decision.
In Alden, a group of state probation officers sued Maine in its own
173
courts, alleging violations of the overtime provisions of the FLSA.
The
Court held that the provision of the FLSA subjecting states to lawsuits in
their own courts was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers un174
der Article 1.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the Eleventh
Amendment was added merely to make explicit a principle the Founders
had assumed from the beginning, and "Con ress acted not to change but to
unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the
Constitution anomalous and unheard-of when the Constitution was
176
adopted."
Suits against an entity in its own courts were forbidden under
166

See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
167
See Alden, 521 U.S. at 712.
168
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (involving patent infringement); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postse.condary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (involving trademark infringement).
169
See, e.g., Col/. Sav. Bank, 521 U.S. at 672 (stating that the object of such legislation must be .. the
remediation of or prevention of constitutional violations").
170
527 U.S. at 728.
171
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201216(b), 203{x) {1994 and supp. IV)).
172
426 u.s. 833 (1976).
173
527 U.S. at 711-12.
174 /d.
175

/d. at 722.

176

/d. at 727 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 18 (1890)).
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the sovereign immunity assumed by the Cro\vn under En~dish La\v and by
the states themselves when the Constitution \Vas ratified. rrr
Beyond recognizing the sovereign immunities observed at the time of
the Founding, ho\vever, the Court insisted that the principles of federalism
embedded in the Constitution required that the dignity of the states be protected.178 Justice Kennedy \vrote that,
[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad po,vers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent \Vith their status as
residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation .•..
• • • •

... When Congress legislates in matters affecting the

States~
17

it may not

treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations.

When the other federalism decisions of recent years are taken together
and vie\ved in light of this language, it becomes clear that the Court intended to do much more than salvage an iota of state dignity from the
'vreckage left by untrammeled federal po,ver. Rather, it desired to restore
an appropriate balance to the federal-state relationship.
At least one \vrinkle remains. As subpart IV.A of this Comment discusses in more detail, the proponents of the treaty po,ver exception assert
that foreign affairs are peculiarly the province of the national government,
and thus the treaty po\ver falls outside the ordinary relationship established
by the Constitution bet\veen the states and the federal government. Under
this theory, the treaty po,ver is, like the Fourteenth Amendment Section
Five po,ver, a unique po\ver of the national government that exists outside
the federal system and is accordingly immune from federalism limitations.
Ho\vever, this assertion is dubious. For one thing, the treaty po\ver, as
part of the original Constitution, is logically part of that Constitution's
180
frame\vork and therefore subject to the same limitations as other parts.
No textual evidence suggests othenvise. In conttast, the Fourteenth
Amendment \Vas designed by its framers specifically to alter, in certain cir181
cumstances the federal-state balance ofpo,ver. Yet, the Supreme Court's
revival of federalism has not spared the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement po\ver.
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Con ress has
gress's po,ver under Section Five has been subject to seemingly conflicting
177
178
179

180
181
182

Id. at 715-16.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 748, 758.
See discussion infra subpart IV.A.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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interpretations by the Court. On one hand, the Court has described the
power as a broad, positive legislative grant by which Congress may intrude
into the "legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
183
states.''
While demarcating the limits of Congress's commerce power in
Alden v. Maine, the Court noted that the Section Five power was broader
than the commerce power because, by enacting the Fourteenth Amendment,
the p-eople "required the States to surrender a p-ortion of their sovereignty
184
that had been preserved to them by the original Constitution."
In other
words, when Congress acts pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, federalism concerns are muted and the interests of the national
185
Therefore, the Court observed that even
government "are paramount."
though Congress could not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from
lawsuit through its commerce power, it could do so under its Section Five
186
enforcement power.
To illustrate the breadth of the Section Five po\ver, the Court bas acknowledged that Congress may enjoin the states from activi that does not

bach v. Morgan,-the Court upheld as proper Section Five legislation a statute preventing New York from imposing literacy tests for voting, despite
188
the fact that the Court had earlier upheld the use of such tests. According
to the Morgan court, Congress may "detertnine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
189
its conclusions are entitled to much deference.'' Morgan led some scholars to ask whether the Section Five power was broad enough to entitle Con190
gress even to overrule the Supreme Court.
And yet, what the Court granted Congress with one hand, it has in recent years taken away with the other. As part of the Court's revival of federalism during the last decade, the Court imposed limits on all national
powers, eventually including even the Se-ction Five power. In City of
191
192
Boerne, the Court considered the constitutionality of the RFRA.
In an
opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court asserted that Congress did not have
..

.

183

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
445 (1976)).
184
527 U.S. at 756.
ISS /d.
186
187

See id.
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (discussing the constitutionality of federal bans on voting

literacy tests).
188 . .
.
384 u.s. 641,646-47
(1966).
189
Id. at 65 11'
f

90

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 216 ( 1997).

u.s. 507 (l997).

191

521

192

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). The statute prohibited fedeml or state regulations that

substantially burdened the exercise-ofreligion without a com,pelling g~vemment interest, and then only
if the least restrictive means wer-e used.
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the po\ver to declare the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment or to de193
termine \vhat constitutes a constitutional violation.
In order to prevent
Congress from adopting improper "substantive" legislation, the Court must
independently confirtn that the legislation in question has "congruence and
194
proportionality" to a particular constitutional violation.
Applying its ne\v congruence and prop,ortionality test, the Court then
determined that although the RFRA sought S\veepingly to enforce the Constitution's protection of a right First Amendment freedom of religion it
did not do so by reference to any actual or potential violation of First
Amendment rights. Congress's factual basis· for the RFRA, the legislative
.

.

record, only containe~ ~xamfles of laws ~f gene~l applicability that inci19

dentally burdened reltgton.
Therefore, m enacting the RFRA, Congress
196
did not act pursuant to its "remedial or preventive po\ver."
In addition,
the Court observed, the reach and scope of RFRA it applied throughout
the nation and had no time limit far exceeded the scope of the problem it
197
sought to address.
·
After City of Boerne, the Court continued to limit congressional exercises of the Section Five po\ver. In fact, it did so even as it declared that
98
po\ver to be inunune from other federalism concerns. ' \Vbert it announced
its decision in Alden, the Court handed do\vn t\vo other significant decisions
that served to hinder Congress's use of the Fourteenth Amendment to overcome sovereign inununity. Both cases involved the State of Florida's effort
199
to initiate a _pre-paid college tuition program.
College Savings Bank \Vas a Ne\v Jersey chartered bank that, in 1987,
began marketing and s~lli~io certificates of deposit designed to finan~e the

costs of college education. The company held a patent on the particular
method it used to administer the certificates. A year later, Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, an arm of the Florida state govermnent, launched a similar program aile edly using the same administrasuit against the State of Florida for patent infringement under the Patent and
202
Plant 'Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act).
193

City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
194
Id. at 520.
195
Id. at 531.
196
Id. at 532.
197
/d. at 534-:35.
198
See Alden,.527 U.S~ at 756 {observing that Congress may, in some situations pursuant -to its § S
power, subject states to suits in their own courts) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 44S (1996)).
199
.
Coli•. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Snv. Bank. 517 U.S. 627,631 (1999).
200
.·
ColLSav.Bank, 521 U.S. at 670·7l.
201
/d. at 671.
202 35 U.S.C. §§ 279(h), 296(a) (1994). This Statute V.11S a C(UJifiC3UOrl Of existing pltent b\V designed
to enable the enforcement ofpatent law against state governments. See FilL Prepaid. 521 U.S. nt 670.
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It also alleged false representations in commerce under the Lanham Act,
claiming that the State of Florida had misrepresented its program in marketing publications. The Court announced its decision on the first claim in
Florida Prepaid; it disposed of the second claim in College Savings Bank.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court held that Florida was immune from lawsuit for patent infringement and struck down as unconstitutional the statute
204
that enabled States to be sued for patent infringement. The Court's decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, built upon the Court's earlier decision in City of Boerne and held that in order to exercise its Fourteenth
Amendment power to subject states to lawsuit, Congress must identify
"with reference to historical experience" a "widespread and persisting dep205
rivation of constitutional rights."
Although patent infringement by the
state technically was a ~'taking" in violation of the Due Process Clause,
Congress had identified no historical pattern of infringement and had failed
to consider remedies available in state courts.
In College .Savings Bank, however, the Court found .no constitutional
206
Florida did not violate due process by engaging in alleged
violation at al1.
false advertising because, as the Court held, there is no recognized "right to
207
be secure in one's business interests."
Significantly, the Court also held
that Florida did not waive its sovereign immunity when it engaged in the
208
business of marketing and selling its college loan program.
In 2000, the Court made clear that the new limitations on Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power applied with equal force in the
arena of individual rights. In Kimel v. Florida Board .o f Regents, th·e Court
struck down the portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
209
(ADEA) that subJected the states to lawsuits for age discrimination.
The
Court had never recognized the elderly as a suspect class, and therefore it
held that Congress could not claim the ADEA addressed a constitutional
210
violation.
As Kimel and Florida Prepaid suggest, in most situations
Congress lacks the power to subject states to lawsuits against their will.
Even the Fourteenth Amendment creates no exception.
These cases strongly indicate that the Court intends to strengthen state
prerogatives while weakening federal ones. However, Congress could attempt to circumvent the Court's recent state sovereignty decisions through
its use of the treaty power. For example, Congress could pass legislation
.

.

203

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). In order to make the Lanham Act applicable to state governments.
Congress passed the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 106 Stat. 3567 ( 1992).
204

527 U.S. at 630.
205
ld. at 640,_645.
206 .
527 U.S~ at 675.
207
208

209
210
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Id. at 672.,
/d. at 687.
120 S. Ct. 631 {2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1967).
See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645-46.
.
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making the provisions of a· treaty protecting intellectual property enforceable against states in state and federal court, thus getting around Florida
Prepaid. Several treaties, including NAFTA and the GATT, have provi211
Scholars have argued that these
sions regulating intellectual property.
treaties, in light of Missouri v. Holland, could be used to expand federal
212
power to regulate intellectual property.
This po\ver could presumably
pennit Congress to subject states to la\vsuits against their \Viii. Finally,
Congress could use existing human rights treaties to enact legislation subjecting_states to la\vsuits for violations of labor or environmental la,vs, thus
circumventing the protection provided by Senzillole Tribe and Alden. Like\vise, as one_scholar suggested, Congress could attempt to get around City
of Boerne by passing implementing legislation for an existing treaty, such
213
as the ICCPR
Ho\vever, Justice Kennedy's opinion hints that such tactics \Vould fail.
In Alden, he noted that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment rejected a
214
proposal to include an exception for the treaty po\ver. Thus, the implica~
tion is that an exception to state sovereign immunity for the treaty po\ver
does not comport \Vith the design of the Constitution. And, to the extent
that Missouri suggests such an exception, the Court \Viii likely overrule it
B. The Rule Against Conznza11deering
As part of its revival of sovereignty federalism~ the Supreme Court
bolstered state sovereignty in another \vay b refusing to allo\v Congress

Court's recent decisions supporting the anti-commandeering principle, but
ultimately finds that principle to be of limited utility in addressing the scope

of the treaty po\ver~
In New York v. United States, the Court first began seriously to revive
the concept of state sovereignty in the context of a dispute about the storage
216
of toxic \vaste. The Court held that Congress could not force the state of
New York to choose bet\veen either adopting federal guidelines or taking
title to the waste and thereby becoming liable for any damages resulting
211

See generally Curtis A. Bradley, TerritoriallntellecJua/ Proper/)' Rights in on Age ofGlobalism.
37 VA.J. INT'LL. 505,546-49 (1997).
212
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda atiYJPO. 37 VA. J. INT'L L.l69. 422
n.302 (1997).
213
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. ExEC. ·Doc. E. 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171;-Neuman, supra note 28, at 49·53.
214
527 U.S. at 721 (''All attempts to weaken the Amendment were defe:Jted. ••• [Congress) refused
as well to make an exception for 'cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United
States.'" (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGR£SS 25, 30; 477, 499 (1794)).
215
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring in,~lid a statute comnundeering
state executive officials); New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144 (199.2).
216
505 U.S. at 144.
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from improper storage.
The Court concluded that Congress does not
218
have the power to commandeer state governments.
However, it is not
easy to tell from Justice O'Connor's opinion whether this limitation on federal power derives from the nature of the Commerce Clause or from the
Tenth Amendment and state,sovereignty inherent in the constitutional structure. Justice O'Connor remarked that the Tenth Amendment is essentially a
tautology in that it reserves to the states (and the people) only that which
the other sections of the Constitution have not granted to the federal govemment219 This is another way of saying that the limits on the powers of
the federal government are to be discovere,d by close examination of the
enumerated powers themselves. Justice O'Connor then did just that she
proceeded to examine whether the provision of the statute fell within the
s~ope o! the c~mmerce power. Ultimately, she found the forovision to be
2 0
"tnconststent w1th the federal structure of our govemment."
However, Justice O'Connor also noted that there exists a symmetry between the powers_reserved by the states_and thos-e granted to the federal
government one begins where the other ends.. And the fact remains that
the provision commandeering the state legislature was offensive to the Constitution. precisely because it regulated states as states. As Professor Martin
S. Flaherty points out, ''the analysis [in New York v. United States] ultimately turned on a trait that only states can possess, an attribute that by any
221
other name would still amount to sovereignty." The Court's decision was
not what it appeared to be;· in fact, it was essentially a Tenth Amendment
analysis dressed up as a Commerce Clause analysis.
222
State sovereignty came to the forefront in Printz v. United States.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion ·written by Justice Scalia, struck down a
portion of the Brady Act that required local chief law enforcement officers_
223
to conduct background checks on potential purchasers of fireanns.
In
reaching its conclusion, the Court examined historical understandings and
practices at the time of the Founding, the structure of the Constitution, and
224
the Court's ownjurisprudence.
Rather than merely looking at the limits of the commerce power as
Justice O'Connor's New, York opinion had done -Justice Scalia's opinion
in Printz broadened the inquiry to address the scope of all federal power. A
look at the historical practice at the time of the Framers, Justice Scalia as217

218
219

/d. at 176.
ld. at 17$..76.

/d.at157.
220
Id. at 177.
221
Flaherty, supra note 149, at 1285.
222
521 u.s. 898 (1997).
223
Id. at 902-03"
224
See id. at 904-18 (examining historical practice); id at 918-25 (examining consti tutionnl struc~
ture); id. at 925-33 (examining Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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serted, revealed no evidence that the Congress could command state execu225
tives to carry out federal regulations. In fact, there \'Vas "some indication
226
of precisely the opposite assumption."
Next, the Court looked at the
structure of the Constitution itself and _found implicit in that structure the
227
"residuary and inviolable sovereignty" of the states.
State sovereignty
could not be abrogated; even by an act that .might othenvise be per1nissible
228
under the Cominerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Scalia \vrote that "[,v]hen a ~La,v ... for canying into Execution' the
Conunerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the
various constitutional provisions \Ve mentioned earlier ••. it is not a 'La\'1 •..
229
proper for canying into Execution the Conm1erce Clause."
\Vith these
words, Justice Scalia seemed to go beyond Justice O'Connor's prior explanation for the source of the rule against cormnandeering.
The Printz Court made clear that the Tenth Amendment created a zone
of sovereignty protecting the states. Thus, the Court appeared to tmnsfoitn
the amendment, once a ''truism," into an independent source of state po\ver
against the federal govenunent. Since Printz applied not just to the commerce po\ver, but all federal po\ver, it seems likely that the Court \Vould apply the same restrictions to the treaty po\ver.

Indeed, scholars have

explored a potential conflict bet\veen the rule against COitunandeering and at
230
least one treaty, the Vienna Convention. A provision of the Convention,
inconsistent \Vith the holding of Printz, requires police officers \vho arrest a
foreign national to allo\v him to consult \vith his homeland's consulate or
231
embassy.
The Supreme Court bas already refused to overtm11 ·the death
sentence of Angel Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, even though the police
\Vho arrested him clearly failed to carry out the Vienna Convention provision.232 This does not resolve the issue, ho\vever, as the Court refused to
225

See id. at 905-08.
226
IlL at 909-10 (noting that the First Congress asked for state nssistnncc in detaining federal prisoners, but did not compel the states' cooperation).
121
/d. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James f..iadison) (Clinton Rossiter cd.,
19.61)).
228
/d. at 923-24.
229

/d.

230

See Neuman, supra note 28, at 52 (arguing that the holding of Pniltz \'tould not apply to cxer·
cises of the treaty power); Tribe, supra note 102, at 1260 (nrguing that the holding ofNeu' YQrk would

not ,apply to exercises of the treaty power); c;t Carlos l'ttanuel Vazquez, Breard. Printz. and the Treaty
Power7 10 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999) (arguing that a narro\v interpretltion of Print: nnd Nen' tork
makes exempting the treaty power from their holdings unnecessary). Bur see James A. Deek,en. Note. A
New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The Impact ofFederalism on lnternalional Trealles rhat Place Afjinnative Obligations on State Go-.·ernments in 1/ze JYake of Printz v. United Stutes. 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1998) (arguing that the Vienna Convention cannot create n-c\v "rights:," nnd' therefore, the exclusionary rule cannot be applied to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the treaty).
231
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, S96 U.N.T.S. 261.
232
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (per curiam); sce-gcnera/1)• Vazquez. supra note
230.
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hear the case for other reasons and did need to reach the anti233
cominandeering question.
The holdings of New York and Printz prohibited only a particular exercise of federal power: the rare and often clumsy efforts of Congress to
commandeer state legislatures and executives. Congress has other means
234
by which it can obtain the same ends.
The states must therefore look to
stronger protections that do not depend on the limits of the national power,
but rather have their source in powers reserved to the states. The Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence that culminated in Alden and the other recent decisions provides that protection.
C. A Revival ofDistributive Federalism Under the Commerce Clause

In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court finally imposed limits on
235
Congress's enumerated powers and revived distributive federalism.
Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1990, making posses236
sion of a firearm in a school zone a federal crime.
The Supreme Court
held that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate under the
237
Commerce Clause.
In support of its decision, the majority returned to a
238
basic definition of "interstate commerce."
A matter that was essentially
local,-such as schools, could not be "interstate." A matter essentially noncommercial, such as the possession of firearms, could not be "commerce.''
To uphold the statute, Rehnquist reasoned, would make the text of the Commerce Clause meaningless because "[it] would require us to conclude that the
Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated . . . and that there will never be a distinction between what is
39
truly national and what is truly local .... This we are unwilling_to do."z
For the next five years, many scholars wondered if the Lopez Court
240
After all, Chief Justice
merely meant to slap Congress on the wrist.
Rehnquist's opinion noted that Congress had provided no express findings
regarding the effects of gun possession in school zones on interstate comSee Breard, 523 U~S. at 375-76.
234
Congress could,-for example, threaten to withhold federal funds if the state refused to execute the
federal regulation. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding constitutional Congress's
indirect encouragement of states through the threat of withholding federal funds,_even where direct nciion
upon the states would be unconstitutional). Also, the line between commandeering of state legislatures and
the mere preemption ofstate statutes by federal statutes can be a fuzzy one. See New York v. United States,
505 u.s. 144 (1992).
233

l3S 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
236
18
§ 922(q) (1994).
237
. .
..

u.s.c.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
238 /d.
239
. /d. at 567-68.
240
See, e.g., Philip F. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 697 (1996) (arguing that Lopez may be
defended as a technique ''to encourage appropriate congressional procedures and considerations*').
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merce. Perhaps that\vas the problem. Ho\vever, in 2000, Lopez doubters
242
acquired ne\v faith \vhen the Court decided Ullited States v. Aforrison.
That case concerned a provision of the Violence Against \Vomen Act that
created federal criminal and civil remedies for acts of violence "motivated
243
by gender,'' even \vhen the perpetrator of the act did not cross state lines.
Unlike the statute in Lopez, VAWA's legislative history contained numerous findings regarding the serious aggregate effects of gender-motivated
244
violence on interstate conunerce. The Court held the provision unconsti-,
tutional an}'\vay. Chief Justice Rehnquist, again ''niting for the Court, explained that Congressional findings of fact \Vere not, by themselves,
"sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of Cotmnerce Clause legislation.''245 The connection bet\veen gender-motivated violence against
\vomen and interstate conunerce \Vas simply too attenuated. If such legislation \vere upheld, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, Congress could easily
regulate not only murder, but marriage, divorce, and cbildrearing as \Veil,
since these activities had an undoubtedly significant aggregate effect on in246
terstate commerce.
One can rec_onstruct the distributive federalism thesis that animates Lopez and Morrison in the context of another seemingly plenary grant to the
federal government the treaty po\ver. The Court could dra\v a distinction
benveen \vhat is domestic and \vbat is international, just as Lopez dre\V a
distinction bet\veen \Vhat \Vas local and \Vbat \Vas national. If the President
and the Senate may make treaties that govern matters of traditional state
concern, such as violence against \Vomen, schools, or the possession of firearms in local cormnunities, then the enumeration of the treaty po\ver in the
Constitution \vould be meaningless. A treaty that mimics the state police
power is not a treaty at all and, therefore, cannot be constitutional.
Ho\vever, there are obstacles to translating the holding of Lopez from
the commerce po\ver to the treaty po\ver. First, the treaty po\'ler may not be
a delegated p-o,ver at all but, rather,-a po\ver reserved to the federal government. In United States v. Curtiss-Wriglzt Export Corp., Justice Sutherland
\vrote that the treaty po\ver \Vas never an enumerated po\ver because it
247
never belonged to the states. Second, distinctions like the one Chief Justice Rehnquist dre\V in Lopez are even more difficult to apply-to treaties.
241
242

See id. at 562.
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).

243

.

. '

42 u.s.c. § 13.98l(b) (1994).

244

See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.

245
246

/d.
/d. at 1753.

299 u.s. 304,318 (1936) ("[T]he_investment orthe fedeml government \'lith the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affinnative gmnts of the Constitution. The powers to deelarc
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties. to milintain diplomatic relations \vilh other so\·ereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the constitution, \Voutd have vested in the federol govern·
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality~"). This argument is dealt \'t'ith in subpJrt IV.B infra.
247
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After all, globalization means worldwide integration at every level, from the
economic and political to the cultural and personal. In the age of satellites,
the Internet, and porous borders, it seems nearly impossible to separate do248
mestic from international concerns.
As Professor Laurence Tribe observed, "[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening
spectrum of issues," a requirement that treaties only deal with matters of in249
ternational concern is "unlikely to prove a serious limitation."
Despite these difficulties, the Court could still choose to demarcate the.
boundaries of the treaty power. Ironically,. a recent decision limiting state
prerogatives hints that the Court could treat the treaty power as just another
enumerated power. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the
Court conside!ed a Massachuse~ Ia~ barrin~ state e?tities from furchasing
25
goods or services from compantes dotng bustness wtth Burtna.
After Japan and the European Union challenged the law before the WTO as inconsistent with U.S.. obligations under its agreement on government
251
procurement, Congress passed its own set of sanctions against Burma.
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court held that Congress's sanctions pre252
empted the state sanctions and did not need to reach constitutional issues.
However, the First Circuit had held that the Massachusetts law violated
both the dormant Forei~n Commerce Clause and a more general "dormant
53
foreign affairs power.'·'
The First Circuit relied on an earlier case,
Zschernig v. Miller, in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional state
probate statutes restricting inheritance rights of persons living in Commu254
nist countries, even though no federal statute governed the issue.
Justice
Souter's opinion in Crosby suggests that the Court is_sympathetic to the argument that the Massachusetts law, even absent preemptive federal ]a\v,
would interfere with the president's power to direct foreign policy and the
255
national government's commitments to the WT0.
·
Crosby, and the lower court's decision in particular, supports the
proposition that the treaty power may function like the commerce power.
Just as the dortnant commerce clause defines the scope of Congress's commerce clause power by reinforcing its basis in interstate commerce, the
dormant foreign affairs power may also define and limit the treaty power by
forbidding the states to conduct foreign economic policy. Admittedly,
248

Bradley, supra note 24, at 451.
249
TRIBE, supra pote 70, at 228.
250
120 S. Ct. 2288,2291-92 (2000); Peter J. Spiro; U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Dow11 State Burma
Law, ASIL INSIGHT (June 2000), available at http://www.asil~orglinsigh46.btm.
251
See Spiro, supra note 250; Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2291-92.
252
Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294..
253
See Nat'lForeign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,58 n.14 (1st Cir. 1999).
2 4
s 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Spiro,.supra note 250.
255
120 S.. Ct. at 2298-99 ("\Ve need not get into any general consideration oflimits of state action
affecting foreign affairs to realize that the President's maximum power to persuade_rests on his capacity
lo bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy .•.•u).
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ho\vever, these arguments \viii remain speculative until the Court fleshes
out the donnant foreign affairs doctrine. Again, it is in the area of state
sovereign inununity that the Supreme Court has established the finnest barrier against incursions by the national government.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF TREATY PO\VER EXCEPTION

The idea that the treaty po\ver ought not be limited by states' rights
rests largely on the premise that foreign affairs are sui generis, or uniquely
the province of the national government. This premise yields t\'10 basic arguments for maintaining the treaty po,ver exception. The first, addressed in
subpart A, is the argument that, \Vith respect to foreign affairs, the nation
"speaks 'vith one voice." That is, history and necessity both dictate that our
system of dual sovereignty simply does not exist outside of purely domestic
affairs. The second argument, addressed in subpart B, reassures proponents
of federalism that the states still have a voice in foreign affairs through the
political process, making judicial enforcement of federalism protections unnecessary. This Part examines these arguments and finds them unconvincing, particularly in light of recent changes in the treaty-making process.
A. Tlze "Oile Nation" Argu11zent

Proponents of the treaty po\ver exception to federalism concerns argue
that the treaty po\ver is uniquely the province of the federal government.
This subpart examines this argument and rejects it as inconsistent \Vith the
text and structure of the Constitution.
The scholar Louis Henkin has declared that "[a]s regards U.S. foreign
256
relations, the states 'do not exist."'
He means that the dual sovereignty
established by the structure of the Constitution does not apply \vhere the
treaty po\ver is concerned. The states never had "international sovereignty," Henkin asserts and, even if they did, they gave it up \vhen they rati257
The Constitution appears to prohibit the states
fied the Constitution.
from conducting foreign affairs or acting as international agents. States
cannot make treaties, coin money, or impose duties or tariffs \Vithout the
258
consent ofCongress.

256

HENKIN, supra note 24, at 1SO.

257

!d. at 19. It is not clear whether the states actually individually possessed ..external sovereignty"

after they declared independence from Great Britain. Those arguing against e:demal sovereignty point
out that no colony declared itself independent of Britnin until nuthorized to do so by the Continental
Congress. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 15. Proponents respond that the ContinentAl Congress \vas
not a political entity, but something more like a "council of states... /d. at 58. Besides, they argue, even
the Articles of Confederation guaranteed the sovereignty of the states. See id.; ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. 2. Yet, the nssumption that the States never hJd e:<temJl
sovereignty is crucial to the reasoning ofCurtiss-IYright. Sec infra notes 259-63 mtd nccompJn)ing tc:d.
2S8
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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Even granting that some foreign affairs activities are off-limits to the
states, it still requires a leap to reach the conclusion that the federal government possesses immunity' from all federalism limitations when acting
pursuant to the Treaty Clause. A much-criticized 1936 Supreme Court de259
cision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., made that theoretical leap possible. The case is in some respects the separation of powers
analog to Missouri v. Holland, but it contains an "essay" by Justice Sutherland that has implications for federalism as well.
In Curtiss-Wright, Congress had passed a joint resolution giving the
president the power to apply a criminal _prohibition on the sale of arms in
the United States to countries engaged in a war in South America. The
plaintiff protested that the agreement was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority to the president. In order to respond to what was, at the
260
time, a valid legal argument, Justice Sutherland drew a sharp distinction
between the national government's power over foreign affairs and its power
over domestic affairs. Justice Sutherland wrote that "[t]he broad statement
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
261
true only in respect of our internal affairs." Sutherland reasoned that the
foreign affairs powers of the national government, in contrast, exist outside
the constitutional framework of power delegations: ''[S]ince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have
been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted
262
to the United States from some othersource."
Justice Sutherland's national sovereignty explanation for the uniqueness of the national government's foreign relations powers has been sub263
jected to Hwithering criticism." Indeed, it hardly follows that because the
power to make treaties and otherwise conduct foreign relations is inherent
in national sovereignty, a treaty impinging on the rights of the states as sovereigns would be pern1issible. The Constitution expressly delegates the
299 u.s. 304,315-16 (1936).
260
The Lochner Em court of Curtiss~ Wright had just struck down New Deal statutes -as unconstitution·
al delegations of power from Congress to the president. See A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495,52942 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.,Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,421-30 (1934).
261
Curtiss-J¥right, 299 U.S. at 315-16.
262
/d. at 316.
263
Bradley, supra note 24, at 43:8. For criticism of the Curliss-JYright decision, see Michael J. Olen·
non, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-\Vright?. 13 YALB J.
INT'L L. 5 (1988); ·oavid M., Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Suther·
land's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-\Vright Export
Corporation: An Historical Reassessnzent, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973). The reasoning of Curliss-JYriglzt was
largely rejected by Justice Robert Jackson, who called it "dictum" in his famous concurrence in the
"Steel Seizure, case. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (19,52)
(declaring a presidential order authorizing seizure of the steel industry unconstitutional despite claims by
the president that the order was necessary for national defense) (Jackson, J., concurring).
259
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treaty po,ver to the national govertunent, just as it delegates the po\ver to
regulate colllltierce. Logically, then, foreign affairs po\vers should be subject
to the Constitution's structural limitations. That the states may never have
enjoyed those po,vers themselves is immaterial. Moreover, the exclusivity
argument is further \Veakened \vhen one considers that the Constitution does
64
pennit states to enter into some kinds of international agreements.2
In general, proponents of special federalism immunity for the treaty
po\ver and the foreign relations po\ver also stress the practical side of the
"one nation" argument: the need for the United States to speak \Vith one
voice in international negotiations. States' rights cannot be allo\ved to limit
the scope of the treaty po\ver because, as Professor Neuman argues,
"[r]equiring the unanimous agreement of ... all the states for ratification of
any treaty that includes a provision addressing 'local' concerns \vould
265
greatly hamper American participation in international treaty regimes."
It is true that effective bargaining may often require a single national
representative \vith the po\ver to make binding commitments. Presidents
266
developed the "fast-track" process for precisely this reason.
Like\vise,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for exclusive federal control of
267
foreign relations.
Ho,vever, examination of the Treaty Clause itself belies
the notion that the Framers believed states should not participate in the making of treaties. Recall that the Framers originally planned to hold the Senate then the states' rights body solely responsible for negotiating and
68
approving treaties.2 Admittedly, the Framers changed the plan to give the
primary negotiating role to the president because of concerns raised by Madi269
son that the treaty-maker should represent the interests of the entire nation.
Ho\vever, the plan still contemplated an active advising role for the Senate,
and any treaty that survived the process \vould have to conunnnd support
from 1:\vo-thirds of the "states' representatives," the United States senators.
Advocates of treaty po\ver exceptionalism \Viii argue that times have
changed. That, ho\vever, is precisely the point. Treaties no\v govern a \Vide
264

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (allo\ving st.ates to enter into "Agreement[s) or CompJct[s]"
with foreign nations with congressional consent); see generally Raymond S. Rodge~ The Cap3Cilj• of

States ofthe Union to Conclude International Agreements: The Background and Some Recenl DC\·elopments, 61 Mi. J. INT'L L. 1021 (1967).
265
Neuman, supra note 28, at 48.
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United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.INT•L L. 143 (1992).
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See, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. \Vages, 423 U.S. 276,285 (1976) ("(T]hc Fcderol Government
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range of matters forrnerly considered to be domestic in nature. When the
subject of the typical treaty was, for example, the resolution of armed conflict in Asia, the need for a strong executive authority was apparent. Now
that a treaty is much more likely to govern, for instance, religious freedom,
a singular role for the President can be troubling. As Curtis Bradley observed, "[i]t is not at all obvious ... that it is necessary or desirable that the
country speak through the Executive with respect to the regulation of reli271
gious freedom."
The states' traditional role in the treaty-making process
seems more appropriate and necessary than ever before.
B. The Political Process Argument

Proponents of a treaty power exception also argue that no substantive
federalism restrictions are necessary because the interests of the states are
272
properly represented in the political process.
This subpart examines this
argument and rejects it on the ground that subsequent practices have undermined all of the traditional state protections afforded through the political process. In addition, even were such protections in place, the federal
government would have a natural tendency to aggrandize itself at the expense of the states.
Proponents of the treaty power exception point out that the states already have a built-in voice in the process that produces treaties. After all,
each state is equally represented in the Senate, and the two-thirds majority
73
requirement ensures the consideration of states' interests.2 Critics have
made similar arguments against federalism constraints on national po,ver in
general. Herbert Wechsler first asserted such a theory in the 1950s, and
274
Jesse Choper subsequently developed it further.
Justice Blackman and
four other Justices adopted the theory in Garcia, the decision that overruled
National League of Cities and pertnitted the application of federal wage and
275
hour regulations to state government employees.
However, in Alden, the Supreme Court appeared finally to reject accountability as the sole federalism protection. Under Justice Kennedy's
theory of dual sovereignty, the judicial branch simply cannot leave the
states to rely only on their representatives in the national government for
protection. State governments have separate accountability to those they
represent: "By 'split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,' the founders estab270

See supra subpart II.C.
271
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272
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Iished 'nvo orders of goverruttent, each \Vith its O\vn direct relationship, its
O\vn privity, its O\vn set of mutual ri hts and obligations to the people \vho
govenmtent and no longer have direct accountability to the governments of
the states they represent. As scholars have noted, national representatives
tend to aggrandize the national institution at the expense of state govemment.277 Professor John Yoo observed that members of Congress have an
interest in expanding the po\ver of the federal government, even \Vhen it
278
may not be politically expedient to do so.
Moreover, the political process argument is particularly \venk \Vhere
treaties and international agreements are concerned. As Part I explained,
the political federalism safeguards envisioned by the Framers for the treaty
power simply no longer exist, or they have been substantially \Veakened.
State legislators no longer elect senators. The Senate usually plays no role
in the \vriting or negotiation of treaties. Moreover, the practice of making
congressional-executive international agreements, rather than treaties, ignores even the Senate's traditional prerogative.
Finally, treaties and international agreements such as NAFfA and the
GAIT are huge documents, and they are even less amenable to clear understanding than the most complex federal statutes. They are more likely to
contain vague or "aspirational" language that is subject to multiple interpretations.279 It may not be entirely clear, either to the members of Congress or
those \Vhom they represent, \Vhat exactly they have approved.
The failure of the political process to enforce the values of federalism
contributes to citizens' discontent \vith that process. Part V discusses the
reasons \vhy court-imposed federalism limitations \Vill increase citizen participation in government and perhaps lessen voter frustration.
V. FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION.

The potential clash bet\veen the Supreme Court's revival of federalism
and the \veil-established doctrine of treaty po\ver exceptionnlism roises the
question: Why is federalism worth protecting? Treaties are fast beginninJB
2
to resemble international legislation binding on much of the \Vorld.
Ho\vever, they are negotiated and \vritten in relative obscurity far from the
276
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people who must live under their provisions.
Ironically, in an age of
globalization, state and local matters grow in importance. As Professor
Barry Friedman observed, the delegation of power to international organizations and agreements creates "a strong incentive to reinvigorate state and
local government . . . in order to return control over other aspects of our
282
lives to governments close to home."
American federalism is a peculiar
283
type of localism built into the Constitution. The states are permanent fixtures in the constitutional framework. This Part argues that federalism provides the best available basis for restoring a sense of power to individual
citizens who feel alienated from the decision-making process.
Increasing reliance on treaties and the executive enforcement of international agreements weakens chains of accountability and creates distance
between citizens and the government. As Professor Cass Sunstein observed, "participation is difficult when the seat of government is far
284
away."
Federalism is valuable because it invests local government with
more power, increasing government's accountability to individual voters.
285
However, democracy is about more than just "one person, one vote. "
Professor Robert Bennett posited a model of democracy that seeks to explain why many do not vote and yet feel they participate in the democratic
process. After all, the opportunities for the individual voter actually to af286
fect the outcome of any particular election are statistically quite smal1.
Under a "conversational" model of democracy, ho\vever, citizens value
above all the opportunity to influence the makers of public policy, not even
through direct dialogue with officeholders, but because they participated in
a public conversation that "genuinely entered into the process of give and
287
take that eventuates in a decision."
By preserving the prerogatives of state government, federalism provides an opportunity for meaningful involvement in the political process itself.288 Voters, for their part, feel that multiple layers of government
289
provide greater opportunities to express their views and be listened to.
As Professor Bennett observed, voters feel the political process is personally meaningful to them even when their opportunities to affect policy out281
282
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comes are sma11. What is significant for most people is that they partici291
pated in the conversation. By giving state government its proper respect,
federalism increases the amount of attention citizens pay to state nnd local
politics and fosters conversation about politics and public policy at the local
292
leve1.
Giving respect to state government strengthens the sense of individual involvement among citizens.
One of the most difficult problems \vith the proliferation of treaties and
293
international agreements is the danger of "one-size-fits-all', govemance.
This trend, lmo\vn some,vhat euphemistically as "hannonization,, seeks to
294
eliminate difference in localla\VS in favor of \Vorld\vide unifonnity.
In
contrast, federalism encourages regulatory creativity, preserving nn arena in
'vhich states can freely experiment, innovate, and copy one another's successes.295 Indeed, there may not be one "right" approach to evety policy
problem. Even at a time \Vhere there is a Starbucks on every comer, state
296
governments still offer their citizens different choices.
The result is
greater freedom for the individual ''consumer'' of government, \vho can al'vays move to a state more suited to her taste.
Critics of American federalism remind us that states historically have
been more likely than the national government to exclude minority groups
297
from the political process. If localism is really the solution, critics argue,
'vhy not empo,ver local governments, \Vhere minorities are likely to have
more influence? The simplest ans\ver is that states are the local entities
recognized by the Constitution. We cannot start again \Vith a clean slate, so

290
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we ought to make the best of it.
But perhaps a false choice is being of.:.
fered between, on the one hand, a variety of state governments with differentiated political cultures_, each of which permits entrenched majorities to
cling to power, and, on the other hand, a monolithic national government
that respects minority rights but imposes a sameness that discourages involvement in politics. The national government can still take steps to protect minorities while preserving a significant degree of autonomy to the
299
states-.
Indeed, Professor Vicki Jackson argues that the permanence of
state geographical boundaries promotes tolerance among racial, ethnic, and
300
religious groups.
State lines do not usually correspond to race or religion. .Maintaining the significance of state governments creates allegiances
301
and civic identities that cut across divisive cultural and religious lines.
It would be naive under any circumstances to rely on the political
process to protect state sovereignty and promote respect of state government without intervention from the courts. This is_particularly true where
the treaty power is concerned. As argued in subpart IV.B, the political protections for the states envisioned by the Founders and built into the treaty
approval process have been worn away. But the treaty negotiation and approval process is particularly troubling from the standpoint of a conversa302
tional model of democracy.
Not only is the treaty rocess ''less
more opaque, The Executive conducts negotiations with little public disclosure or media attention, particularly since the advent of "fast-track'' legislation.304 It is no wonder, then, that a sense of frustration drew a veritable
cross-section of society to protest at the WTO meeting in Seattle. Many felt
unelected officials were making important decisions in secret. It is this aspect of the treaty power that is most destabilizing.
The Supreme Court's enforcement of federalism limitations upon treaties and other international agreements would not completely solve these
problems. Nevertheless, it would force both the president and Congress to
pay more attention to state concerns in the process of negotiation and ratification. States would be more likely to assert themselves in the treaty process, and this could in tum create a dialogue that would be useful to citizens.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The forces of globalization \viii continue to :put pressure on national
govenunents to legislate through treaties and international agreements. The
Court \viii interpret the constitutional status of this legislation in light of the
Treaty Clause jurisprudence, even though fonnal treaties themselves are becoming more rare. If Missouri v. Holland remains good la\v, very little can
prevent a torrent of international standards from \Viping out state prerogatives.
The inevitable conflict bet\veen the uniqueness of the treaty po,ver and
the Court's revival of federalism should be resolved in favor of federalism.
Since the incentives for the political branches at the federal level to protect
states' rights are fe\v, it \viii be up to the courts to enforce federalism limitations. The most recent Supreme Court decisions establish a firm grounding
for federalism in the constitutional structure, leaving courts better equipped
to protect states_' rights.
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